

THE LIMITATIONS
OF THE
EDUCATIONAL THEORY OF
JOHN DEWEY

BY
JAMES H. O'HARA, A.M.

A DISSERTATION

*Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic
University of America in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy*

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INTRODUCTION

The most significant thing about modern education is its determined attempt to establish a philosophy which will make meaningful the work of education. In no realm of life, perhaps, has there been such feverish activity during the past several decades as there has been in the field of education. Every factor in the educational process has been the object of scientific scrutiny. Of late years the very magnitude of the work of education has so impressed educators that they are coming to realize the need of the evaluation, the direction and the sponsoring of genuine and fruitful activity which proceeds from a recognition of the educational ideal. A vivid consciousness of the ideal is necessary to unify and vivify everything in the school system, including the curriculum, methods, tests, supervision and administration.

The renewed interest in the philosophy of education, as manifested in the works of present-day educators, has resulted especially from the increasing realization of the interrelation of philosophy and education. The failure of the experimental method to determine the objectives of education has evoked a demand for philosophy to explain the final reasons for the teacher's work. The character formation movement has also awakened a deep interest in the philosophy of education. The increasing demands of a changing social order have provoked thought on the meaning of life, its purpose, and its values.

Education receives from philosophy the ideal of life which occupies the central position in the work of the school. The ideal has the same importance for education that philosophy has for the universe. The importance of philosophy in the world is indicated in the following quotation from Chesterton:

"There are some people, and I am one of them, who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a

general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but it is still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them."¹

The statement is applicable to education, for in the long run nothing else affects it except philosophy. Nicholas Murray Butler says: "It (education) aims to prepare human beings for life. The measure of its success will always be the understanding which it has of the terms, human being and life."² Pace expresses the same idea: "The meaning of life, of its purposes and values as understood by the educator, primarily determines the nature of his work. (Education aims at an *ideal*, and this in turn depends on the view that is taken of man and his destiny, of his relations to God, to his fellow-man, and to the physical world.)"³

Various expressions of the ideal of life are met with in a democracy, because constituted authority does not undertake to form the ultimate beliefs of the people. Our national literature reveals the presence of many expressions of philosophy, such as Realism, Idealism, Rationalism, Pragmatism, etc. These various systems have led to various ideals of life, which find their counterpart in educational theory and practice. Hence, we have such ideals of education as culture, harmonious development of the faculties, universal knowledge, formal training, utility, character, adjustment to environment, development of personality, social efficiency, etc. The ideals of education proposed are the reflections of the ideal of life established from interpreting man, society, nature, and God. It is only after understanding the ideal of life that body or content is given to the ideal of education. The ideal of life is the ideal of education; and if it makes no difference in educational practice, it must be "artificial."

The present thesis is a study of the meaning for education of the Pragmatic ideal of life as presented by John Dewey of Columbia University. He has been the leader of the Pragmatic movement in America since the death of William James in 1910.

¹ G. K. Chesterton, *Heretics*, p. 15. New York: John Lane Co., 1909.

² Nicholas M. Butler, *The Meaning of Education*, p. 9. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

³ E. A. Pace, "Education," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, V, 296.

It is, more precisely, a comparative study of the meaning of Pragmatism and Scholasticism for Life and for Education. The central theme is that the ideal of life is the ideal of education, and that it is only by understanding the ideal of life that one can understand the ideal of education and the principles that flow therefrom. The ideal of life will be continually envisaged from the standpoint of education, and the ideal of education from the standpoint of life. It is in this fashion that we aim to present an exposition and review of the interpretation for life and for education which Pragmatic philosophy deems necessary from advances made in politics, in industry, and in science.

The importance of a study of this kind will be recognized from the prominent position which Mr. Dewey holds in education. He is unquestionably one of the outstanding educators of modern times. In the opening chapter it will be indicated how widespread is his influence.

The method of the work consists in exposition, interpretation, and evaluation. The exposition will be, as far as possible, in Mr. Dewey's own words. Obviously a treatment of his whole philosophy would be beyond the range of the dissertation. Hence a selection will be made on the basis of the content of the ideal of life and the ideal of education. In interpreting points difficult of understanding recourse will be made to writers on Mr. Dewey's philosophy and education. Criticism will include what the writer considers are the advantages and limitations of the theories under discussion.

The democratic ideal of life as proposed in the philosophy of Pragmatism is considered before a consideration of educational theory, inasmuch as it prepares the way for the understanding of the educational theory. A separate chapter is devoted to an explanation of salient features of Mr. Dewey's principles of education and of his ideal of education. Thereupon the writer essays a review in the last two chapters of his ideal of education and of his principles and practices of education.

The study has been made especially with the needs of the Catholic school teacher in mind.

CHAPTER I

JOHN DEWEY

Charles Darwin published *The Origin of Species* in 1859, the year in which John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont. The two events are significantly linked together, because Dewey's interpretation of the work of Darwin was to play an important rôle in his democratic conception of life and of education. Dewey attended the state university in his native city, and later entered Johns Hopkins University, from which institution he received the doctorate in philosophy in 1884. He dedicated himself to philosophy under the guidance of William T. Harris, whose translations, writings, and lectures helped to bring Hegelian philosophy to America. This system was to influence Dewey's outlook upon philosophy, particularly during the beginning of his professional career. While at Johns Hopkins, he came under the influence of G. Stanley Hall, who was interested particularly in biology and adolescent psychology. Dewey, as a university professor, the career he embraced immediately upon graduation, has been at the following institutions: University of Michigan, 1884-1888; University of Minnesota, 1888-1889; University of Michigan, 1889-1894; University of Chicago, 1894-1904. From 1902 to 1904 he was the Head of the School of Education at this last institution, successor to Francis W. Parker. Since 1904 he has been professor of Philosophy at Columbia University. While at the University of Michigan, according to Slosson, "he sounded the note of his philosophy . . . in a paper on 'The Ethics of Democracy,' and he has never faltered in his allegiance to the high ideal he there set forth, although he has broken away from the Hegelian mode of thought he then used."¹ The years at Chicago mark the period of his personal active experimentation in educational work.

¹ Edwin E. Slosson, *Six Major Prophets*, p. 246. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1917.

Dewey has made many and valuable contributions to American philosophical and educational thought. In the field of philosophy, the most important are: *Psychology*, 1886; *Leibnitz*, 1888; *Critical Theory of Ethics*, 1894; *The Study of Ethics*, 1894; *Studies in Logical Theory*, 1903; *Ethics*, (with J. H. Tufts), 1908; *How We Think*, 1909; *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays*, 1910; *German Philosophy and Politics*, 1915; *Essays in Experimental Logic*, 1916; *Creative Intelligence* (with others), 1916; *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, 1920; *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922; *Experience and Nature*, 1925; *The Public and Its Problems*, 1927. *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, 1928, selected and edited by Joseph Ratner of Columbia University, aims to present a unified and comprehensive outline of the total range of Mr. Dewey's philosophy.

In the field of education the following are Dewey's main works: *My Pedagogic Creed*, 1887; *The School and Society*, 1889; *The Educational Situation*, 1902; *The Child and the Curriculum*, 1902; *Moral Principles in Education*, 1909; *Interest and Effort in Education*, 1913; *Schools of To-morrow* (with his daughter Evelyn), 1916; *Democracy and Education*, 1916.²

The number of philosophical and educational articles in periodicals is very large. Because these articles are so numerous, and because many of them are to be found in hidden-away periodicals, Slosson has been led to say: "The graduate student of twenty-five years hence who undertakes to get a Ph. D. by making a complete collection of Dewey's works will earn his degree."³ The most important of all his works is perhaps *Democracy and Education*; the earlier productions may be looked upon as finding their culmination in this volume; subsequent publications are for the most part an elaboration of ideas contained in this work. One reviewer characterizes it as "one of the profoundest treatises on education in the language," and not merely "an introduction to the philosophy of education,"⁴ the sub-title which the author modestly gives it.

In his review of later American philosophy, Morris R. Cohen

² Milton Halsey Thomas of Columbia University is compiling a bibliography of Professor Dewey. Cf. *The New Republic*, April 17, 1929.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

⁴ Norman Wilde, Review of "Democracy and Education," *Educational Review*, LXIX (Feb., 1920), 169-170.

declares that Dewey is "the only American about whom has been formed a regular philosophic school."⁵ He is, as has already been noted, the leader of the Pragmatic school. Its most characteristic feature is perhaps its application of the hypotheses of evolutionary biology to psychology, logic, ethics, and education. Professor Dewey entered the field of philosophy by way of Hegelianism, but it was not long until he rejected most of its features. The reason perhaps was because of its extreme idealistic tendencies. In fact he reacted rather intensely against every system of philosophy that was intellectualistic or absolutistic. Dewey entered upon his professional career when Americans were more concerned with philosophy than ever before in our national history.

We were gradually emerging from frontier life, and the lessening demands of practical life afforded the leisure for higher education. As a consequence the number of students increased. The American schools in the closing decades of the last century were spurred on in their philosophical endeavors by the publications of Darwin, Lyell, and others interested in evolution. Simultaneously the beginnings of what has come to be called a distinctive American Philosophy were being made. In 1878 Charles Pierce contributed an article to the *Popular Science Monthly*, entitled "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." In this paper he set forth a new method for ascertaining the meaning of concepts and judgments which he designated as Pragmatism and later as Pragmaticism. According to Mr. Pierce, the real meaning of an idea is the practical effect it will have in action. William James, twenty years later, rescued Pierce's method from a seeming oblivion, and by means of many addresses, articles, and books spread abroad his own conception of Pragmatic Philosophy. Dewey at the same time was working out his theory of Instrumentalism. This theory treats the problem of knowledge from the genetic and evolutionary point of view. Mind as well as body was looked upon as the outcome of favorable variations which have occurred through the agency of natural selection. Like the physical organs, mind is an instrument of adaptation to environment. Mental functions, such as memory and imagination, are expressions of the evolutionary

⁵ Morris R. Cohen, "Later Philosophy," *The Cambridge History of American Literature*, Vol. III, Later National Literature, Part II, 254.

process, just as are purely physical organs, such as the eye, the ear, and the heart. They are all regarded as resultant effects of wholesale interaction with environment. Accordingly, Instrumentalism regards ideas as tools, instruments, plans of action, by means of which man gets along well with the environment in which he lives. Ideas are always intended to meet a particular crisis in life, or a rupture of continuous experience caused by the needs of a concrete situation. Professor Dewey's philosophy may accordingly be classified as Naturalism, since it accepts evolution as explanatory in itself of all life. From the point of view of its emphasis upon environment, it may be considered as Behaviorism. Horne brings out this thought when he says: "More recently his (Dewey's) writings have stressed . . . the nature of man as a living organism reacting to stimuli, which is Behaviorism."⁶ In fact, one writer says: "Professor Dewey's most distinctive achievement also is behaviorism."⁷ Inasmuch as his philosophy postulates the testing of all ideas in action, it may be termed Experimentalism. These various classifications come under the generic designation of his system as Pragmatism.

The influence of Darwin, as well as that of Pierce and James, his predecessors in the Pragmatic movement, is to be noted in a consideration of Dewey's philosophy. Of others, the first to be mentioned is Francis Bacon. He is a thinker to whom Dewey particularly acknowledges indebtedness. He says: "Francis Bacon of the Elizabethan age is the great forerunner of the spirit of modern life. . . . Bacon may be taken as the prophet of a pragmatic conception of knowledge," and he "presents an almost perfect example of the union of naturalistic and humanistic interests."⁸ Dewey is likewise indebted to Mill, Bain and Spencer.

He seems to have been influenced also by such writers as Isaac Newton, John Locke, David Hume, Auguste Comte, and Lamarck. In educational theory, specifically, he is primarily indebted to Rousseau, "whose *Emile*," Babbitt thinks, "has

⁶ Herman H. Horne, *The Philosophy of Education*, p. 293. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927.

⁷ C. E. Ayres, Review of "Human Nature and Conduct," *Journal of Philosophy*, XIX (Aug., 1922), p. 470.

⁸ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 28, 38; *Democracy and Education*, p. 330.

become, if not in its specific recommendations, at least in its general spirit, the Bible of the modern educator."⁹ Other educators who may be listed as exerting an influence include Montaigne, Pestalozzi, Froebel and Herbart.

Dewey's reasons for becoming an educator, while remaining a philosopher, may be gathered from his own words. He says: "The fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread and widely felt difficulties in social practice is disguised because philosophers become a specialized class which uses a technical language, unlike the vocabulary in which the direct difficulties are stated. But where a system becomes influential, its connection with a conflict of interests calling for some program of social adjustment may always be discovered. At this point, the intimate connection between philosophy and education appears. In fact, education offers a vantage ground from which to penetrate to the human, as distinct from the technical, significance of philosophic discussions. The student of philosophy 'in itself' is always in danger of taking it as so much nimble or severe intellectual exercise—as something said by philosophers and concerning them alone. But when philosophic issues are approached from the side of the kind of mental disposition to which they correspond, or the differences in educational practice they make when acted upon, the life-situations which they formulate can never be far from view. If a theory makes no difference in educational endeavor, it must be artificial. The educational point enables one to envisage the philosophic problems where they arise and thrive, where they are at home, and where acceptance or rejection makes a difference in practice."¹⁰ Dewey, the Philosopher, becomes Dewey, the Educator, because education is the clearing house for philosophical theories, the experimental ground upon which are tested in action the truth of views about man and nature. The philosophy which he espouses is broadly practical in its origin, emerging from felt difficulties in the social environment. It is likewise practical in its nature, he thinks, because philosophy apart from environmental connections tends to become meaningless; it is concerned with effects, not so much with causes; it looks to im-

⁹ Irving Babbitt, "President Eliot and American Education," *Forum*, LXXXI (Jan., 1929), 2.

¹⁰ *Democracy and Education*, p. 383.

mediate consequences in practice rather than to remote beginnings and ultimate goals. Education is, as it were, the laboratory in which philosophical distinctions become practical and are tested.

Professor Dewey's influence upon American schools has been extensive. It is said there is scarcely a schoolroom in the nation that has not been benefited by his contributions. Very few schools have attempted to work out his ideal in all its ramifications, yet there are some salient points emphasized by him that are embraced in most schools. His influence upon education is not limited to American schools, for he spent two years in China lecturing to teachers on the reform of education and he made a report to the Turkish government on the reorganization of its national schools. Kerschensteiner in Germany, Findlay in England, and Claparède in France acknowledge their indebtedness to him. The American influence exerted upon Soviet education for a period of years is presumably Dewey's.¹¹ Japan likewise has felt his influence, for the lectures which make up the volume, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, were delivered in 1919 at the Imperial University in Tokyo. His influence is consequently world wide.

A variety of opinions regarding the merit of the thought of any man is to be expected during the life of the man. Time must pass before a just and final estimate can be made. Dr. Dewey has enthusiastic defenders; but at the same time his every work seems to be a target for those who differ from him.¹² William H. Kilpatrick, who regards Dewey as America's foremost student in the field of educational philosophy, says: "It is not flattery but simple fact to recognize in him the outstanding figure in the development of the philosophy of education during the period under discussion"¹³ (1897-1922). In an address delivered at Columbia University on the occasion of an unveiling of a bust of Dr. Dewey, Kilpatrick said: "I see in Professor Dewey the modest sincerity of Socrates, the radical constructive

¹¹ John Dewey, *Impressions of Soviet Russia*, p. 64. New York: The New Republic, Inc., 1929.

¹² Cf. Reviews of "Democracy and Education" by J. E. Creighton, *Philosophical Review*, XXV (Sept., 1916), pp. 735-741; "Human Nature and Conduct," by G. C. Field, *Mind*, XXXII (Jan., 1923), 79-86.

¹³ William H. Kilpatrick, "Tendencies in Educational Philosophy," in *Twenty-Five Years of American Education* (I. E. Kandel, Ed.), p. 77.

thinking of Plato, the balanced outlook of Aristotle. Like Socrates he too has brought philosophy down from the clouds to dwell among men. Like Plato he has married philosophy and education with like fertile results. Like Aristotle he has mediated conflicts, but less often by finding a 'mean' between contending elements than by showing the unreality of conflict and shifting the problem to more fruitful lines."¹⁴ G. C. Field has something different to say: "Where he (Dewey) does mention a particular thinker or school of thought by name, he rarely does justice to them, and in some cases simply misunderstands them. . . . To Aristotle, indeed, Prof. Dewey is consistently unfair throughout. He writes of him as if Aristotle had written nothing but the second part of the Tenth Book of the *Ethics*, and he betrays no appreciation of the fact that in reality Aristotle shared and anticipated many of his own most fundamental doctrines."¹⁵

W. H. Sheldon is of the opinion that Professor Dewey "is the democratic philosopher in the world of American democracy, as Hegel was the aristocratic in the world of Prussian aristocracy, and he carries democracy to quite as great an extreme as did Hegel his aristocracy."¹⁶ Arthur Kenyon Rogers gives the following estimate of Dewey's philosophy: "It cannot be denied that in the interest of making *all* judgments practical, and *all* objects of knowledge ideals, Dewey has created a highly speculative philosophy, whose practical value seems at best only the negative one of clearing away supposed mental obstacles to change and reconstruction."¹⁷

H. Wildon Carr holds that Dewey's "style is never lucid or technical, and the meaning is often obscure;" and again, "we cannot help feeling that Professor Dewey's doctrine draws much of its fascination from its being kept in the background."¹⁸

¹⁴ William H. Kilpatrick, "Remarks at the Unveiling of Dr. Dewey's Bust," *School and Society*, XXVIII (Dec. 22, 1928), 779.

¹⁵ G. C. Field, Review of "Human Nature and Conduct," *Mind*, XXXII (Jan., 1923), p. 85.

¹⁶ W. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, the Protagonist of Democracy," *Journal of Philosophy*, XVIII (June, 1921), 315.

¹⁷ Arthur K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 393. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923.

¹⁸ H. Wildon Carr, Review of "Experience and Nature," *Philosophical Review*, XXXV (Jan., 1926), 64.

Waldo Frank says: "The lack of organic wholeness brings an isolatedness to Mr. Dewey's pages of philosophy, and makes it far easier to set them down than to take them up." While he regards Mr. Dewey as a leader of childhood, he does not accept him as a leader of maturity. "He cannot see man whole, because he fails to find the nucleus of focus, of organization, of timeless subject-value, and of transformation, within the self. He is himself a child of chaos, and his works are chaos."¹⁹

From leaders in the field of education we have gathered the following appreciations. Rugg and Shumaker declare Professor Dewey to be the "intellectual rationalist of democracy's new school"; he is a creative analyst "who cut straight through the superficial details of administration and visualized the school in a totally new orientation." These writers give some characteristics of his educational theories when they say that the child-centered schools, "under Dewey's revolutionary leadership, have focused attention upon the continuous growth of the child, upon freedom, initiative, vivid self-expression."²⁰ H. H. Horne, an Idealist in Educational Philosophy, incorporates a special chapter on Pragmatism in a revised edition of his *Philosophy of Education*. He pays tribute to Dr. Dewey as "the outstanding exponent of contemporary philosophical thinking in the field of education."²¹ Franz De Hovre places Dewey among "the foremost philosophers and educators of our age."²² Ross L. Finney, whose recent work, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, contains criticisms of some of Dewey's theories, earlier wrote: "The value of his theories is not so much in their originality as in their timeliness."²³ Henry Neumann says that the service of Instrumentalism "has been greater in exposing the harm done by the traditional schooling than in pointing to concrete, positive ends."²⁴ We note that this estimate of

¹⁹ Waldo Frank, "Our Leaders," *The New Republic*, LV (June 20, 1928), 116.

²⁰ Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker, *The Child-Centered School*, *passim*. Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Co., 1928.

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 292.

²² Franz De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique*, p. 98. Brussels: Librairie Albert DeWit, 1927.

²³ Ross L. Finney, *The American Public School*, p. 269. New York: Macmillan Co., 1921.

²⁴ Henry Neumann, *Education for Moral Growth*, p. 185. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1928.

Dewey's contribution to education is somewhat like Roger's estimate of his contribution to philosophy. E. P. Cubberley pays tribute to Dewey in these words: "The foremost interpreter, in educational terms, of the great social and industrial changes through which we have passed, and the one who has done more since 1895 to think out and state for us an educational philosophy suited to the changed and changing conditions in our national life, is John Dewey."²⁵ Henry Suzzallo says that Dewey is "a thinker whose vital influence upon the reform of school methods is greater than that of any of his contemporaries."²⁶ Walter R. Smith classifies Dewey among those who "must have interpreters, less specialized individuals who can transform his thoughts into simple terms and practical programs."²⁷

Two varying estimates of Dewey come from the pens of two men who were closely associated with him, one as professor, the other as pupil. We refer to G. Stanley Hall and Will Durant. Dewey was a pupil of Hall's at Johns Hopkins in 1884, and Durant was a pupil of Dewey's at Columbia in 1917. Hall says: "The educational writings of John Dewey have in recent years had much vogue in this country and his influence has been highly stimulating and salutary. The average conservative teacher who reads him thinks himself progressive, but never to a degree that makes him feel unsafe or even much unsettled. To those, however, versed in pedagogy Dewey not only has nothing new to offer but seems obvious, if not platitudinous, and as if he anticipated the attitude of experts in this field toward him, he severely criticizes them. It is to them, however, that he is chiefly indebted for the ideas which most teachers associate with his name. He is best described as a mediator between child study and the old philosophical orthodoxies of Herbert, Hegel, Hamilton, or other more or less metaphysical thinkers, so that great and beneficent as his influence has been, it is transient, because he lacks originality. I could never understand why he should attack the principle of recapitulation when

²⁵ Ellwood P. Cubberley, *Public Education in the United States*, p. 359. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1919.

²⁶ Introduction to Dewey's *Moral Principles in Education*, p. x.

²⁷ Walter R. Smith, *Educational Sociology*, p. 63. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928.

his own school at Chicago was based on it; why to show the rôle of measurements in teaching number he deemed it necessary to disparage if not deny any place for counting or other processes; why his characterization of the Gary Idea as making the life of the community flow through the school should be thought novel; or, indeed, why his explanation of the system should so often be preferred to that of its author."²⁸ Durant's words on Dewey are decidedly different from Hall's. He says: "Dewey first caught the eyes of the world by his work in the School of Education at Chicago. It was in those years that he revealed the resolute experimental bent of his thought; and now, thirty years later, his mind is still open to every new move in education, and his interest in the 'schools of to-morrow' never flags. Perhaps his greatest book is *Democracy and Education*; here he draws the varied lines of his philosophy to a point, and centers them all on the task of developing a better generation. All progressive teachers acknowledge his leadership; and there is hardly a school in America that has not felt his influence."²⁹ Writers familiar to the educational public who acknowledge their indebtedness to Dewey are, Boyd H. Bode, George A. Coe, Joseph Kinmont Hart, S. S. Colvin, and P. E. Harris.

A recapitulation of these varying quotations seems in order, but their heterogeneity makes anything concise difficult. At best, but general tendencies can be indicated. ✓ The general philosophers who have been quoted suggest some weaknesses in Dr. Dewey's philosophy. With the educationists his position seems more secure. There are some who appear to accept his theories enthusiastically; others concede a partial acceptance, and a third group appears to reject the theories he advances. Philosophy and Education are so intimately linked that it is but natural to expect that the serious questioning of the philosophy of Pragmatism, so characteristic of much of present-day thought, will eventually be reflected in the questioning of the educational system of Pragmatism. Accordingly, educators have of late years approached these theories more critically, as is evidenced by the recent works of Neumann and Finney. A variety

²⁸ G. Stanley Hall, *Life and Confessions of a Psychologist*, pp. 499 ff., New York, 1922. Quoted by H. H. Horne, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-295.

²⁹ Will Durant, *The Story of Philosophy*, pp. 566 ff., New York, 1926. Quoted by H. H. Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

of opinions relative to philosophy and education arise in our Democratic state, because of the differences that exist in regard to the highest ideal of life. Kilpatrick calls the attention of a group of German educators, assembled at Columbia University, to the many distinct philosophies taught in America.³⁰ Creighton in his review of *Democracy and Education*, insists upon his point that Pragmatism is not the only philosophy of democracy. He says: "Pragmatism has no exclusive claim to be a philosophy of democracy, or a philosophy which is open-eyed to the results and methods of the sciences. I make this remark because writers of this school frequently convey the opposite assumption."³¹ Just as there are various expressions of the ultimate view of life, so also there are various expressions of the ideal of education; and from these arise divergent theories of the nature and the function of the factors in the educative process.

The discussion of Dr. Dewey thus far has concerned itself with a brief account of his life and of his most important philosophical and educational works; a presentation of his philosophical development; an account of his influence; and, lastly, a record of many appreciations of him as a philosopher and as an educator. We shall now consider the ideal of life which he defends, placing in contrast at vital points the Catholic ideal of life.

³⁰ William H. Kilpatrick, "Philosophy of American Education," *Teachers College Record*, XXX (Jan., 1928), p. 13.

³¹ J. E. Creighton, Review of "Democracy and Education," *Philosophical Review*, XXV (Sept., 1926), 739.

CHAPTER II

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL OF LIFE PROPOSED BY JOHN DEWEY

DEMAND FOR A NEW CONCEPTION OF LIFE

It is fundamental in a consideration of Dr. Dewey's thought to realize that he has broken with tradition and has addressed himself to the task of formulating a new conception of life which, he maintains, is demanded by modern developments. He regards the accumulation of intellectual riches to be so extensive that "a generation . . . is compelled to pull down its barns—its systems of philosophy and doctrine—and build greater" ones.¹ Radical changes have occurred, he thinks, and corresponding radical changes are required in our ideal life. These changes have been chiefly threefold, political, scientific, and industrial: Political changes have occurred in so far as modern democracy is becoming more and more conscious of itself and is realizing its basic aim of equal opportunity and development, promoting progress by its grant of freedom, advocating the free and full cooperation of all the people in a common life, common interest, and common destiny. Scientific changes demand a changed outlook upon life because of the development of the experimental method in the physical sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences,² and behavioristic ideas in the psychological sciences. Industrial changes have resulted from the scientific advances and are creating the most acute problems for philosophy at the present time. Because of these changes, he avers, a thoroughgoing reconstruction of traditional ideals is necessary for the meanings implicit in advancing democracy to be realized.

¹ Joseph Ratner, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, p. 502. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928.

² Cf. *Democracy and Education*, Preface, p. v; pp. 386-387.

THE CONTENT OF THE IDEAL

An examination of Professor Dewey's ideal of life should reveal his basic views of life, since these constitute the content of every ideal. This means that an account should be given of man's origin, his nature, and his destiny; the answers to the questions: Whence am I? What am I? and Whither am I going? As man does not live to himself alone but has relations to his fellowman, to the State, and to the Creator, an account must likewise be given of these relations. Accordingly, the ideal of life presents a criterion of morality, by means of which human actions may be passed in judgment. It concerns itself with a recognition of the place and function of order in civil society, and takes cognizance of man's relations to God. Underlying all these problems, Dr. Dewey's system places the epistemological problems of the origin, nature, and extent of knowledge, and the criterion by which knowledge is judged to be true or false.

The solutions which philosophers have offered for these questions have almost invariably found expression in the ideal of education. It is a matter of common knowledge that the students of the history of philosophy and of the history of education concern themselves with both the ideal of life and the ideal of education as proposed by the great philosophers, such as Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Des Cartes, Bacon, Rousseau, Locke, Kant, Hegel, Spencer, etc. Men who have advanced new conceptions of life have likewise formulated new conceptions of education. Professor Dewey avowedly addresses himself to the formulation of a new philosophy of life, and hence of education. Our first task is to attempt an explanation of what he considers the province of philosophy.

THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophers have for centuries looked upon philosophy as a knowledge of all things in their ultimate causes. De Wulf says that this "does not mean the aggregate of the human sciences, but 'the general science of things in the universe by their ultimate determinations and reasons,' or again 'the inti-

mate knowledge of the causes and reasons of things,' the profound knowledge of the universal order."³ If these definitions are properly understood they mean that philosophy is the resultant expression of man's contemplation. He takes the facts of his own experience, of his relations with others and nature, and upon reflection comes to a final explanation of existence. This explanation gives a satisfactory answer to the problems of existence, and from it flow the ultimate principles of human life and activity.

Dewey regards philosophy as primarily practical, not contemplative. Its special mission, he says, is in its application to the problems of men. Hitherto it has been too much concerned with the problems of philosophers, and as a result has lost itself in innumerable cults, superstitions, and dogmas. It has attempted to justify by logically organized systems of thought the values which an inert tradition has upheld. Its extraordinary concern for abstract definition and ultra-scientific argumentation has reduced it, at the worst, "to a show of elaborate terminology, a hair-splitting logic, and a fictitious devotion to the mere external forms of comprehensive and minute demonstration. Even at the best, it has tended to produce an overdeveloped attachment to system for its own sake, and an over-pretentious claim to certainty."⁴ Dewey attempts to recall philosophy to what was its task in the beginning, which, he holds, was social and practical because of its concern with human needs.⁵ It is not to be concerned with ultimate or absolute reality, but with something very particular arising out of the subject-matter of experience within a specific individual or social situation. While traditional philosophy contemplated the whole of life, this new philosophy regards an individual situation of human life. The former sought out the ultimate causes; the latter seeks out present effects, consequences in human weal or woe. The one aimed at establishing a fixed body of truths, principles and ideals that should guide human activity; the other considers such an acquisition impossible; for it regards experience as the only reality, and experience is characterized especially by change. On this account principles

³ Maurice De Wulf, "Philosophy," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, XII, 25.

⁴ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 21.

⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, ch. I.

and truths are not fixed and universal but are changing and particular. They are constantly in a condition of becoming, and by the assumed purposive character of evolution eventually become more and better adapted to the condition of man.

This conception of the province of philosophy is designated by Dewey as pragmatic, i. e. its range is the broadly practical rather than the strictly rational, contemplative, or speculative. It sets aside any considerations of philosophical problems which have in the past but led to seemingly interminable disputes. As such it is a revolt against intellectualism; it exalts the province of sense, while it diminishes the province of intellect. This means that it would deny to the intellect any power of revealing fact and delivering truth of itself; for it demands a checking up of the rational in action, which signifies that the senses must verify in every instance the truth at which the intellect arrives. The intellect, therefore, which has been generally considered as the highest faculty of man, is made the servant of the senses. It is not made co-equal with, but subordinate to, sense experience.⁶

This limitation of the field of philosophy represents a violent reaction against abuses that are in no way inherent in philosophy. Philosophy has had an elaborate terminology; but so has each of the sciences. What is granted to the particular sciences cannot be denied to the general science of the universe. Further, a certain amount of wholesome devotion to his science is as praiseworthy with the philosopher as it is with the scientist in his realm. The abuses which have grown out of the pursuit of philosophy are not sufficient cause for discarding altogether the problems of philosophy; nor do they warrant that extreme distrust of the intellect in formulating propositions by its own power from the data of experience. We consider that practical philosophy in the long run emerges from speculative philosophy, and from the latter it obtains the adequate force, direction, and motivation for the relief of the social and moral problems of man. This will become clearer as the implications of the new philosophy are made manifest.

Philosophy, doubtless, was in a larger measure practical with

⁶ Cf. Edward G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, p. 275. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918.

primitive groups, because the limitations of the social heritage and the pressing demands of life made prolonged delving into speculative problems difficult, if not impossible. However, primitive man was concerned with the basic problems of philosophy, those of man's origin, nature, and destiny. This can be gathered from the universal existence of some form of religious belief. The answers to these questions were manifold and even contradictory, but the fact remains that whatever belief was set up became the guiding belief of life.

The speculative nature of philosophy is distinctly recorded in the history of philosophy. Aristotle considered philosophy to be primarily concerned with the problems of philosophers. In the discussion of the relative worth of the speculative and practical life, he unhesitatingly accepted the superiority of the former. Yet one writer esteems him as "a thinker who will be found to be more completely experimental than many moderns who profess to found their whole philosophy on experiment."⁷ The Pragmatists assert that philosophy has to do with the problems of men. They invert the conclusion of Aristotle and unhesitatingly assert the superiority of the practical life, the subordination of speculative to practical activity.

Dewey's subordination of the speculative to the practical results in the domination of philosophy by science. There is no one who will deny the contributions to the betterment and enrichment of human life that have come from science. This should not mean, however, that science is to usurp the place of philosophy. Our basic claim is that philosophy arises out of contemplation, and this has a place in every scientific procedure. Dewey would seem to minimize the rôle of contemplation. A consideration of his exposition of the experimental method, which plays so important a part in his reconstruction of the ideal of life, will tend to bear this out. He says: "Nowadays, if a man, say a physicist or a chemist, wants to know something, the last thing he does is merely to contemplate. He does not look in however earnest and prolonged way upon the object expecting that thereby he will detect its fixed and characteristic form. He does not expect any amount of such aloof scrutiny to reveal to him any secrets. He proceeds to *do* some-

⁷ Irving Babbitt, "President Eliot and American Education," *Forum*, LXXXI (Jan., 1929), 4.

thing, to bring some energy to bear upon the substance to see how it reacts; he places it under unusual conditions in order to induce some change."⁸ It is evident that with scientific experiment no amount of contemplation will accomplish an external result; but this should not mean that contemplation is to be ruled out in insistence upon activity. Indeed, it has a very definite place. Contemplation for advancement in physics or chemistry does for these sciences what the broader contemplation does for all life, viz., it indicates purpose and goals, suggests various modes of procedure, directs activity, and evaluates it. The scientist would not actually proceed to do something unless he has first of all contemplated; without it, his action would be action for the sake of action. His first task is to locate and contemplate the problem he is about to attack. Then he introduces novel conditions in order to induce some change, and finally he contemplates the results.⁹

Contemplation has, therefore, a very important place in experiment in the physical sciences. From whatever source a problem may arise, whether it be from interaction with environment, or from pure intellectual activity upon the data of experience, its solution depends upon contemplative thinking, is even accompanied by it, and is followed by it. Professor Dewey would admit a kind of contemplation, as would seem to be implied by his analysis of the complete act of thought.¹⁰ Yet throughout his works the emphasis is upon activity. This is in conformity with the pragmatic attitude of seeking results. It is implied in the acceptance of the evolutionistic theory that multiplied activity will somehow or other lead to advancement. It is borne out when we consider his explanation of freedom: "Freedom for an individual means growth, ready change when modification is required. It signifies an active process, that of release of activity from whatever hems it in."¹¹ It is indeed an active process, but again direction is necessary to prevent freedom from becoming capricious, even destructive of what has been established.

⁸ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 112-113.

⁹ Cf. W. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, the Protagonist of Democracy," *Journal of Philosophy*, XVIII (June, 1921), 319.

¹⁰ *How We Think*, ch. VI.

¹¹ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 207-208.

Again, freedom implies capacity to remain firm and rigid, when the intellect approves firmness and rigidity. Sheldon says that "it is the omission of counterpart-truths like this that renders his doctrine a menace."¹²

The emphasis which Dewey places upon experimental procedure, as being concerned only with the problems that are obtrusive in attention, is an unnecessary delimitation of the field of inquiry. Many scientists proceed with their undertakings, merely for the acquisition of knowledge for the sake of knowledge. They delve into various problems impelled by that native urge of the intellect to acquire truth; practical application may follow, and indeed has followed upon many investigations, but primarily knowledge was sought, and only subsequently was application made. In the long run great advances have thereby accrued. Morris R. Cohen regards that conception of philosophy as a poverty conception which does not include the pursuit of philosophy not only as a means but also as an end. He says that the greatest advances for human weal and woe have come precisely from the devotees of pure science such as Galileo, Newton, or La Grange. Specifically, "we should never have had wireless electricity and the consequent saving—or destruction—of life, if Maxwell had devoted himself to the promotion of human welfare instead of speculating about the ether—which may not exist at all—and about the purely mathematical properties of electro-magnetic equations."¹³

Educators are coming to realize that the experimental method is not of itself sufficient to determine the final objectives of the school. They admit that many helpful advances have followed upon its application. Snedden, Bobbitt, Charters, Peters, and others have made contributions in the scientific determination of the objectives of education. While such attempts are very valuable, education needs the direction coming from a full philosophy of life. School men are now stressing the need of philosophy. Thus S. S. Colvin says: "Educational objectives must be determined from within by a sound philosophy of education. In this way, and in this way alone, is it possible to

¹² *Op. cit.*, 318.

¹³ Morris R. Cohen, "John Dewey's Philosophy," *The New Republic*, VIII (Sept. 2, 1916), 119.

set up worth while and relatively permanent educational objectives. It is the business of the philosophy of education to evaluate human experience, and to discover those values most significant in human attainment and progress."¹⁴ Bode recognizes the incompetency of the scientific method in determining educational objectives: He says: "In my opinion all this industry called the 'scientific determination of objectives' is on a par with catching birds by putting salt on their tails. The problem of ultimate objectives is not a scientific problem at all. The function of science is to reveal what agencies can or might be employed to realize ultimate objectives; it does not undertake to determine the objectives themselves."¹⁵ George S. Counts has the same thought: "The fundamental goals of education cannot be determined by scientific method. They are a product of a process of evaluation, which, while dependent on the results of science, cannot be identified with these results. As man learns more about this world in which he lives, these goals will be modified, and, let us hope, improved; but men will always disagree in some measure regarding the nature of the good life."¹⁶

The determination of final objectives of education is not a problem of science, any more than the final determination of philosophical theories is a problem of science. Ryan says of the latter: "It is hopeless, as a general rule, to seek for an experiment that will prove or disprove a given philosophical theory, for a 'philosophical problem is rarely such that it can be proved or disproved by some action devised *ad hoc*.' And the reason for this is that a philosophical position involves a statement about realities which, because of their intangible nature, cannot be weighed or measured, cannot be tested in the experimental sense of the word."¹⁷

Contemplation, then, is necessary in the physical sciences,

¹⁴ Quoted by W. R. Smith, *Educational Sociology*, p. 614. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928. Cf. *School and Society*, XVII, 505-513.

¹⁵ Boyd H. Bode, "The Most Outstanding Next Steps for Curriculum Makers in the United States," *Teachers College Record*, XXX (Dec., 1928), 190.

¹⁶ George S. Counts, "The Subject-Matter of the Curriculum," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, I (Jan., 1928), 16.

¹⁷ James H. Ryan, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, p. 355. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924. Cf. A. Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, p. 46.

and in the moral and philosophical sciences. Contemplation in action may be contemplation of the practical advantages of action; this is the kind Dewey especially approves. Again, contemplation in action may not be for the immediate betterment of human estate; it may arise from curiosity. Dewey does not place much emphasis on this kind of contemplation. Contemplation may be of being in its totality as in a full philosophy. Dewey excludes such contemplation from his philosophy.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

The greatest effect of the scientific, industrial, and political changes, Dewey says, has been "to substitute an Idealism based on epistemology, or the theory of knowledge, for the Idealism based on the metaphysics of classic antiquity."¹⁸ The problem of knowledge is accordingly elevated to central position in all life, and its solution becomes effective in all departments of life. Dewey, as well as other Pragmatists, has revolted against the intellectualistic and absolutistic preoccupation with finished logical systems, and claims at least a hearing for the theory of knowledge which he sets forth.

In approaching the epistemological problem, the fundamental fact to be observed is that knowledge exists. Apart from any other implication, be it psychological or metaphysical, man has come and does come into possession of knowledge. The plain man recognizes a distinction between the subject knowing and the object known. In this there is the expression of a metaphysics—the existence apart of two kinds of entities, mental and material. The problem of the contact of the world of mind and matter is a problem of psychology. As we conceive it, therefore, knowledge begins by the action of the object known upon the subject knowing. It involves the separate and distinct existence of two independent realities, of mind and of the world.

One approaches Dewey's explanation of the problem of knowledge with much hesitation, because of the difficulty of understanding his position. Yet some consideration is neces-

¹⁸ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 49.

sary inasmuch as he makes this problem of central importance. It affects his outlook upon all departments of life, social, educational, moral, and religious. It finds its counterpart in educational theory and practice in his now famous aphorism, "learning by doing." It is the basis of his outlook upon progress, and is fundamental in his political scheme. In a word, all human life is, for him, dominated by his solution of the problem of knowledge.

One of Dewey's favorite methods of attack upon the problems which have harassed philosophers for centuries is to render them meaningless by denying their existence. The dualisms, antitheses, or separations, which have been elaborated in the past, he would have us believe, were grounded in social stratifications or artificial divisions in society. He proclaims that "all philosophy has its *raison d'être* in the organization and constitution of social life."¹⁹ Democracy is against the establishment of classes; but Dewey goes a step further and maintains that the dualisms of the philosophers are likewise set aside once the social organization which sponsored such dualisms is rejected; in other words philosophers, face to face with a certain social organization, attempted to give rational sanction to, and thereby tended to perpetuate, the divisions which they met in society. The new social order does away with the older social and philosophical divisions. The most common were those of noble born and common born, rich and poor, those who worked with their minds and those who worked with their hands, etc. They prevented free intercourse. Democracy aims to break down any barriers to universal association and promotes the free and full cooperation of all the people. The philosophical counterpart, Dewey avers, of these social divisions is found in the many dualisms which have continually occupied the thought of philosophers. Many of them, which he aims to overcome, are met with in his writings, such as those of mind and body, mind and the world, experience and nature, learning and doing, labor and leisure, culture and vocation, motive of action and consequences of action, experience and knowledge, theory and practice, intelligence and social service, subject-matter and method, spiritual and physical, etc. The

¹⁹ *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 277.

basic dualism of all is considered that which isolates "mind from activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects."²⁰

Activity becomes the supreme ideal of life. It is the axis about which everything else turns, mind included. The problem of knowledge thus takes a unique position in Dewey's scheme. We have already indicated that this problem has three definite aspects: It supposes a subject knowing, an object known, and the interaction of these two distinct realities. The central problem of epistemology becomes for us the relation of thought, the activity of the subject knowing, to reality as such. For Dewey, it turns out to be the demand for activity to meet a particular life situation. The knowledge relation and the validity of this relation become one and the same thing. Truth is not the conformity of the intellect with reality, but consists in activity, in what happens, in what works, in what is done in a particular situation. Dewey says explicitly that "the effective working of an idea and its truth are one and the same thing."²¹ Truth is not tested but is made by its successful operation. In place of an intellectual standard, a volitional and emotional one is established. Instead of conceiving truth as an inherent quality of an idea, the criterion now is the resultant satisfaction in action. Truth becomes ambulatory, dynamic, subject to revision, as the particular life situation presents new conditions which are different from previous experiences. Driscoll says: "Truth with Professor Dewey is, what is 'instrumental' for 'satisfaction'. Hence truth is relative to the person; what is useful to me may not be useful to you, and what is useful to me to-day may not be useful to-morrow. Thus truth changes with persons, times and places. But this is skepticism and destroys the basis of physical science."²² Spaulding in criticizing Pragmatism says: "If the anti-intellectualistic and immediate conception is accepted, that the *outcome* is the sole test, then may not what some call evil be to others the good, the false at one period may be the true at another, the beautiful to some may be the ugly to others, and, conversely in each

²⁰ *Democracy and Education*, p. 377.

²¹ *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*, p. 143.

²² John T. Driscoll, *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea*, p. 24. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1915.

case." And again he says: "*Explicitly*, in its epistemology, Pragmatism is *relativistic* and *individualistic*." ²³ Dewey's solution of the problem of knowledge in its insistence upon activity would seem to make man the measure of all things.

His analysis of the problem is considered from one point of view only, namely from the side of activity or behavior. In reality, this is but a small phase of the question. It omits any consideration of the problem from the viewpoint of our inner awareness of knowledge, since concern is with behavior only. Dewey can make activity or external behavior the sole concern of his inquiry only by assuming as illusions other things that people generally consider to be non-physical, psychical or spiritual. His conception avoids consideration of that capacity of the intellect to attain to the essences of things, and even to turn in upon itself and come to a knowledge of its own essence. This lack is consciously felt in Pragmatism, for it makes all knowledge reducible to sensations and denies the capacity of knowing anything from the very activity of the intellect alone acting upon the data of sense experience. It considers behavior alone to the neglect of introspection. It also unnecessarily narrows down the field of philosophy to the particular individual or social situation, to the present, felt need which is urgent in its demand for attention.

Instead of having philosophy concern itself with the whole of reality, Dewey restricts philosophy to present and urgent moral and social difficulties. He says: "It has been repeatedly suggested that the present limit of intellectual reconstruction lies in the fact that it has not as yet been seriously applied in the moral and social disciplines." ²⁴ The method of reconstruction is the experimental method used in the sciences with such well-known results. We have already considered this method under the previous heading. In connection with it here, it will be sufficient to note with Rogers: "It is not obvious how the turning of philosophy from the work of interpreting reality . . . into a 'method' merely, has supplied us with any practical tool for the rectifying of specific social ills . . . Dewey's analysis is perfectly general, and leaves concrete questions, as before, to

²³ Edward G. Spaulding, *The New Rationalism*, pp. 288-289; 302. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918.

²⁴ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 162.

the familiar methods of common sense and good judgment, enlightened by expert knowledge."²⁵

The insistence upon the present situation arises out of the evolutionistic idea that heed for felt needs leads to advancement. Doubtlessly in many cases, apart from any evolutionistic profession, response to urgent needs ameliorates human conditions. Again, there are other responses to felt needs which personal and traditional knowledge evaluates as detrimental, and in such instances not action but control is advisable and demanded. What is required first of all is a full view of reality to give evaluation, and then application is to be made to the moral and social disciplines—or more precisely, to ethical problems, for Dewey identifies moral and social.²⁶ Rogers considers that "he is going out of his way to make unnecessary trouble when he insists that the ethical problem is for man the only legitimate one, and that it supplants the need for paying attention to questions about the nature of the real world in which the ethical situation arises, or about the way in which we are able to know this world. Ethical edification, no more than religious edification, can safely precede an impartial scrutiny of fact."²⁷ It is only from a full view of reality that the highest individual and social advancement is made possible and that change is introduced without disorder.

This full view supplies the needed purposiveness. Underlying the pragmatic theory is the evolutionistic postulate²⁸ that multiplied changes will eventually result in progress. Without a full view of life there is no guarantee that ultimate success will be the only outcome. Changes very easily work in the opposite direction, destroying advances that are considered as sound expressions of progress. Without well established principles and ideals from which action is to proceed, individual life is at the mercy of whims, caprices, impulses, and social life is disturbed and troubled by the agitations, propa-

²⁵ Arthur K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800*, p. 393. New York: Macmillan Co., 1923.

²⁶ Cf. *Democracy and Education*, p. 415; *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 319.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 393-394.

²⁸ For a thoroughgoing consideration of Scholastic philosophy and evolution, cf. Fulton J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence*, Part II, ch. IV. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925.

ganda, and vagaries of all sorts of fanciful theorists. Activity is necessary for rectifying the ills of democracy; but for it to be wholesome and sound it presupposes definite, stable and fixed truths which come from a comprehensive view of life.

This latter conception of activity places the epistemological problem in its proper setting. It takes due cognizance of mind and of the external world, and holds to the separate existence of these two distinct entities. It recognizes a firm and solid basis for the criterion of truth, as the conformity of the intellect with reality; such a norm is fixed and universal while the Pragmatic criterion is changing and particular. It accounts for the phenomena of psychical and spiritual factors in life, instead of apparently dismissing them as illusions. It holds that progress is attained best by a view of the whole of man's life and of the whole of reality, rather than by the seeming purposiveness of an evolutionary process whose existence in an extreme form is seriously questioned by the latest writers.

We are now in position to understand what Dewey considers the basic dualism of all dualisms, viz., the one which isolates "mind from activity involving physical conditions, bodily organs, material appliances, and natural objects." With the scholastics, the intellect is an inorganic faculty of the simple, immaterial, and spiritual substance, or soul. Its task is that of interpreting the world. The intellect is that power which enables man to arrive at a knowledge of spiritual objects, such as justice, goodness, virtue, truth, etc. Its formal adequate object is every being; its formal proportionate object is the quiddity or essence of sensible things.²⁹ The senses deliver impressions of the material world, which the intellect takes up and interprets. The Scholastic doctrine is opposed to any theory of innate ideas and to any hypothesis of a panpsychic mind continually manifesting itself. It regards knowledge as beginning in sense impressions, but as not confined, or reducible to, sense impressions, because the intellect acting upon the data of sense experience comes immediately to know the essence of sensible things and mediately to know the essence of every being.

²⁹ Cf. Fulton J. Sheen, *Religion Without God*, pp. 198-223; 260-262; 307-309. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1928. J. S. Hickey, *Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae*, II, pp. 331 ff. Dublin: M. H. Gill & Son, 1920.

Dewey regards mind as something acquired, something built up by activity in interaction with environment. By the Scholastics it is considered as a spiritual faculty of the unifying, constitutive, and operative form of human life. The Scholastics recognized, it is true, that there is an increase in the content of the mind, but at the same time insisted that this is possible only because of the nature of the mind as a spiritual principle. Hence, in the acquisition of knowledge, mind is distinct from the external world; it is not just something correlated with the external world as Dewey seems to hold in his account of the basic dualism. Mind is more than an organ of behavior; it is the spiritual faculty by which we come to know the essence of all things. Primarily it aims to know, not to act; and secondarily, it is the genuine source of worthwhile action because of its highly evaluative power. It establishes fixed and stable principles and ideals, and consequently is the prime source for the expression of purpose. It brings that wealth of value and direction which can come only from the total view of reality. It is as much the possession of man as that distinctive principle is which makes man man, and from the operation of which the intellect tends to the knowledge of sensible objects and of every existing being. Hence we amend Dewey's expression of the basic dualism; for our conception requires the existence of mind anterior to activity and of its power to interpret the whole field of reality, and holds that the mind serves activity best by its deliverance of sound and conclusive truths and ideals. Physical conditions, material appliances, and natural objects constitute the formal proportionate objects, in the knowing of which the bodily organs deliver sense impressions. From the elaboration of these latter the intellect comes to a knowledge of their essences, and thereupon to the knowledge of other essences which are within their range. Mind therefore is not just an attitude of "participative response in social affairs"³⁰ but is elevated to its proper place of interpreter of the whole of reality. Again, it is by the latter that men's fundamental attitudes toward the world are fixed, and not "by the scope and qualities of the activities in which they partake."³¹ The fundamental outlooks,

³⁰ Cf., *Democracy and Education*, p. 370.

³¹ Cf., *ibid.*, p. 159.

as guaranteed by philosophy and strengthened and added to by religion, become the possession of peoples variously classified in society, such as governing and governed, rich and poor, capitalists and laborers, etc.

The foregoing account requires an extension of Dewey's outlook upon cultural and practical life. We grant the potentialities of the practical to be rich in cultural values. Through it one may constantly expand "the range and accuracy of one's perception of meanings."³² However, our conception of the operations and formal object of the intellect forbids the restriction of the cultural to practical activity. Consequently we amend and extend the cultural to mean that contemplation of the whole of reality, the interpretation of which is the province of the intellect. Everything practical may become cultural, but the culture of the intellect in its first instance is not practical, since primarily the function of the intellect is to know. Upon interpreting all life, it enunciates the principles from which genuine activity is to proceed in the amelioration of individual and social life.

Dewey's ideal of life consequently suffers from his view of the function, nature, and province of the intellect of man. The ideal activity which he sponsors for the betterment of human estate is accordingly weakened, and reflects, whether it be applied to individual, social, political, educational, or religious life, the imperfections of the theory of knowledge from which it emanates.

THE ORIGIN, NATURE, AND DESTINY OF MAN

That which distinguishes Dewey is the undisguised assurance with which he accepts the theory of evolution. Man is for him the culminating expression of a long series of evolutionary processes. He says: "Man's home is nature; his purposes and aims are dependent for execution upon natural conditions. Separated from such conditions they become empty dreams and idle indulgences of fancy. . . . This philosophy is vouched for by the doctrine of biological development which shows that man is continuous with nature, not an alien entering her processes from

³² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

without.”³³ In this quotation is expressed the naturalistic basis of Dewey’s ideal of life, and consequently his ideal of education. Evolution is invoked to explain everything that exists. Dewey’s entire conception excludes the acceptance of creation. Consequently, the question of man’s origin is settled by him as being naturalistic. He makes man the highest animal organism. The Scholastics make man a little less than the angels. They teach that man is created to the image and the likeness of God. Whatever may be said as to the origin of man’s body, it is maintained for certain that the soul of man is the result of the creative act of God.

The Scholastics teach that the essence of man is summed up in the terms, rationality and animality. They recognize in man a spiritual substance or soul which is the substantial form of the body. The soul is the principle of immanency of action, or of life. It accounts ultimately for all the diverse operations of which man is capable. Dewey rejects the doctrine of a spiritual soul because, in harmony with his theories, it cannot be demonstrated experimentally. His teaching may be gathered from the two following quotations: “Inconsistencies and shiftings in character are the commonest things in experience. Only the hold of a traditional conception of the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blinds us to perceiving what they mean: the relative fluidity and diversity of the constituents of selfhood. There is no one ready-made self behind activities.”³⁴ Again, he says: “The doctrine of a single, simple and indissoluble soul was the cause and the effect of failure to recognize that concrete habits are the means of knowledge and thought. . . . Now it is dogmatically stated that no such conceptions of the seat, agent or vehicle will go psychologically at the present time.”³⁵ Dewey’s dismissal of the soul arises from the behavioristic viewpoint of psychology which was considered under the foregoing heading. Man is viewed merely from the standpoint of behavior, and as a result Dewey’s conception of human nature is a conception of activity. An observer of human activity notes “inconsistencies and shiftings in character,” i.e., in action; he

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

³⁴ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 138.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-177. An empirical psychologist has a chapter on the soul. Cf. T. V. Moore, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 402-412. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1926.

also notes that habits embody capacity to do things in the same way when a new situation requires a repetition of a previous act, and hence that knowledge, as far as he can observe, is bound up with habits. If human life were altogether mechanical, inconsistencies and shiftings in character would not occur, because then habit would automatically function to meet the specific situation in response to stimuli. But when new situations arise, our observer notes the varied actions of the human actor. He tries various modes of procedure, and keeps experimenting until a successful issue is secured. Old ways of response are seen to be made use of, and new ways are impetuously attempted to meet successfully the needs of the situation. The new impetuous elements in action are impulses; and hence the observer, noting activity and it alone, defines the successful meeting of the situation, or thinking, as a delicate interplay of habit and impulse.

But there is another account of the activity. It is the one we have already insisted upon, that coming from the actor who meets the situation. It involves on his part the necessity of contemplation—a very prominent factor in human life. The defect in the activity explanation is that it neglects the interior aspect and fails to see just what is the true nature of the actor and what is his equipment in meeting not merely one situation in life but life itself in all its fullness and meaning. It recognizes situations arising from environment, but fails to note that man can create a situation. The most, therefore, that we can expect from such an explanation is a valuable half truth. What our inner awareness of our experience reveals is that it is the one self that is ever present in all our activities. As far back as memory extends, every normal person is conscious that he has always been the same one identical person. In the order of being, man is distinct in his own species from all other beings in existence, and the soul is that principle of life which so constitutes him in his proper class. It is not the body alone which makes man, nor the soul alone, but the informing of the former by the latter. *Operatio sequitur esse*, say the Scholastics; and from the operations of man, the existence of a spiritual principle is arrived at. Our previous discussion brought out, in the specific operation of the faculty of the intellect, the spiritual nature of its operations. Furthermore, it is true to say that all

the operations in man have their origin radically in the spiritual informing principle. Psychology without such a concept of the soul loses its traditional meaning. Dewey's exposition of the nature of man is radically different therefore from that of the Scholastics.

The destiny of man is earthly according to Dewey's naturalistic and experimental conception of life. As he denies the existence of the soul, *a fortiori* he sets aside any hope of immortality. The question arises: what is the highest good in life, as he conceives it? This may be answered simply by saying that the individual is to make a return to society that will at least equal what he has received. The individual is to cooperate for his own upbuilding; and not merely cooperate, but also react to life as he meets it in order to make his contribution. Dewey explicitly makes these two factors in life the characteristics of democratic society.³⁶

The Scholastics, on the other hand, while carefully noting man's social offices, teach that the destiny of man lies in his eternal salvation, for which he is to prepare by sanctifying his soul in the present life. They recognize that God is to be found not only in the inner recesses of the soul but also in cooperation with our fellowman. Mr. Dewey's thought does not concern itself with the supernatural. Cohen remarks: "His (Dewey's) philosophy . . . is dominated throughout by what I must regard as an unwise fear of other-worldliness."³⁷

The Scholastic conception of life necessitates a central and important place for religion in human life. In fact, it is as necessary for sanctification and salvation as the air we breathe is necessary for the preservation of human life. It accepts unreservedly the teachings of the Founder of Christianity, our Lord Jesus Christ, as interpreted by the Church which He established. Religion is mentioned but once by Dewey in his *Democracy and Education*, and then only because of its supposed conflict with science.³⁸ While Pragmatism would logically seem even to admit the existence of diverse systems of truth by reason of the criteriology it professes, such disparity is foreign to the

³⁶ *Democracy and Education*, p. 100.

³⁷ Morris R. Cohen, "John Dewey's Philosophy," *The New Republic*, VIII (Sept. 2, 1916), 119.

³⁸ Cf. *Democracy and Education*, p. 381.

Scholastic conception. In a word, the latter holds that the firmly established truths of science can never come into conflict with religion, for truth is one from whatever source it originates, and cannot be in contradiction with itself. Dewey has, in other publications, expressed his opinion as to the place of religion in human life. He says: "A learned and self-conscious generation has fittingly discovered religion to be a universal tendency of human nature. . . . Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, it is the part of men to labor persistently and patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science."³⁹ "When the emotional force, the mystic force one might say, of communication, of the miracle of shared life and shared experience is spontaneously felt, the hardness and crudeness of contemporary life will be bathed in the light that never was on land or sea."⁴⁰ Though the soul is dismissed from the body, and God is dismissed from religion, religion is not to be dismissed from life. Interaction and reconstruction are to be the beacon lights which will illuminate with hitherto inexperienced radiance the hard and crude lot of a generation experimentally but not spiritually wise. These are the new tools for providing "that grace and sanction of life which ignorant and poor people have possessed as matter of course." Taking his outlook as a whole, it is clearly seen that the new religion is secularistic, naturalistic, and evolutionistic. The findings of democracy and science, we profess, cannot come in conflict with the truths of supernatural religion, and this because truth is one whether it comes from God directly by Revelation, or indirectly by reflection upon the spectacle of creation, "For the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." Furthermore, the "miracle of shared life and shared experience" is possible in its richness and fullness only when the supernatural truths are reverently received and actively followed in the manifold individual and social activities of life. We do not consider the "light" of democracy and science sufficient of itself to attain the highest life, but rather the Light of Christ, "Lumen Christi." St. John calls Him the "true light,

³⁹ Joseph Ratner, *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, pp. 502, 505-506. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1928.

⁴⁰ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 211.

which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world." He says of Himself: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life."⁴¹

In all of the separate points under consideration, Dewey's conception is essentially different from that of the Scholastics. He denies to man a divine origin and divine destiny; makes him a little higher than the brute, rather than a little less than the angels. He rejects the existence of the soul, and makes religion purely naturalistic. His narrow conception of man's origin, nature, and destiny, arises out of his theory of knowledge.

MORAL AND POLITICAL LIFE

Dewey's wholesale rejection of tradition results in the denial of fixed ends, and of a universal moral law based on the very nature of right and of wrong. Just as in the intellectual life there are no fixed principles, so also in the moral life there are no fixed laws and ends. Fixed principles and fixed ends are regarded by him as props for a feeling of safety which are the refuge of the timid and the means by which the bold prey on the timid. The rejection of fixed principles, laws, ends and ideals accords with his basic contentions in regard to the province of philosophy and the theory and criterion of knowledge.

The pragmatic criterion of truth is reflected in Dewey's explanation of morality. Just as all knowledge, judgment and belief result from the interaction with environment, so do improvised principles of morality arise from the same interaction. The good is the liberation of activity. He says: "Good consists in the meaning that is experienced to belong to an activity when conflict and entanglement of various incompatible impulses and habits terminate in a unified orderly release in action."⁴² Again, the "good is always found in a present growth of significance in activity."⁴³ It is apparent that the "good" and the "true" are made convertible; or, more exactly, it appears that the true is subject to the good. Both have to do with the release of activity from whatever restricts it. In the conflict arising from

⁴¹ John, I, 9; XIV, 6.

⁴² *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 210.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

the entanglement of habit and impulse, the good is the satisfaction concomitant with the successful issuance of energy. Instead of an intellectual criterion of reference by which something is judged to be good, there is a reversal in the process described, and that which produces satisfaction, or is felt to be good, is likewise true. With the Scholastics, the intellect plays the important rôle in human life of determining what actions are good. Those actions are good which are conformable to reason; those are bad which are contrary to reason.⁴⁴ Hence reason is the immediate norm of the free action of man, but the remote is the eternal law, that is, the Divine Nature.⁴⁵ With the Pragmatists, reason is dethroned from its position of establishing the criterion, and satisfaction or feeling or utility becomes the criterion. This opinion is strengthened also when we recall that the system is anti-intellectualistic and reduces itself to an apotheosis of sense, because it demands that truths prove themselves in outward test or experiment.

Dewey seems to be the disciple of Rousseau in his exaltation of feeling, of sentiment, of activity, and in his distrust of the intellect, and his supposition of the natural goodness of man. In fact, Rousseau was one of the potent forerunners of the present Pragmatic movement.⁴⁶ Dewey, like Rousseau, minimizes the value of logical thought. Rousseau wrote earlier: "Si (la nature) vos a destinés à être sains, j'ose presque assurer que l'état de réflexion est un état contre nature, et que l'homme que médite est un animal déprave." "Naturellement l'homme ne pense guère."⁴⁷ It is just this reflection and contemplation pursuant upon which man establishes fixed principles and fixed ends that determine the outlook upon morality. Then "an orderly release of action follows, and growth of significance in activity" proceeds. But Dewey will give no consideration to fixed principles or ends. They are contrary to his naturalistic and evolutionistic philosophy. The true and the good are for him ever in a process of change, and he rejects any supernatural and transcendent elements in truth or morality. Crassman says

⁴⁴ *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. XVIII, a. 5.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, q. XXI, a. 1; q. XIX, a. 4.

⁴⁶ Cf. A. Schinz, "J. J. Rousseau, a Forerunner of Pragmatism," *Monist*, XIX (Oct., 1909), 481-513.

⁴⁷ J. J. Rousseau, *Discours sur l'inégalité*, pt. I. *Emile*, Bk. V.

that his theory by its "undue narrowing of attention to the combating of the 'supernatural,' the 'transcendent,' 'fixed,' and 'ready-made,' frequently impresses one as a combat with a man of straw. . . . If past theory has overemphasized the 'fixed,' 'final,' and 'complete,' Dewey's wholesale castigation of this tradition is as short-sighted as it is fatal."⁴⁸

Pragmatism identifies the moral with the social, and the moral is determined by the attendance of success upon activity in a social medium. The viewpoint is not to be taken that society dominates activity by a repertoire of social habits and ideals which the individual is to make his own as rapidly as possible. Such a condition Dewey would regard as suitable for an aristocratic society but not for a democratic order which is dedicated to change and not to conformity. The individual seems to be the final arbiter in what is good and in so far as his activity is dominated by what is useful or satisfactory for the needs of the present situation, thus far is it moral. Finney appears to interpret his opinion in the same way when he says that Dewey in his philosophy makes the word "social" practically synonymous with "voluntary."⁴⁹ Dewey would have the individual consider the social value of his action, by directing it to the betterment of social life. But without fixed principles, without a criterion of examination for the direction of activity, he seriously weakens his program of activity. He deprives activity of that saneness of purpose which comes from a candid review and acknowledgment of all life, and also of that motivation which arises from the same source. Crassman considers that Dewey's doctrine "negates the possibility of individual and social progress which, curiously, is the burden of the whole school."⁵⁰

The view of the whole of reality which the Scholastic conception of life contemplates makes accessible for individual and social life ultimate principles and ends which evaluate, promote, and direct activity. Besides directing and promoting a genuine self-expression, it also requires an attention to self-control. These factors in human life do not exist as ends, but rather as

⁴⁸ Paul Crassman, "Dewey's Theory of the Moral Good," *Monist*, XXXVIII (Oct., 1928), 616.

⁴⁹ Cf. Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 155. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Cf. *Democracy and Education*, pp. 28, 29 ff.

⁵⁰ *Op. cit.*, 617.

means for the attainment of the highest goods of life. In the Pragmatic conception the emphasis upon activity leads to a neglect of consideration for control, for self-restraint, for humility, etc. Cohen expresses a like thought when he says: "In the main, however, he (Dewey) emphasizes improved control over external nature rather than improved control over our own passions and desires."⁵¹ In the Scholastic scheme which has formulated a clear conception of life, of man's origin, nature, and destiny, due consideration is given to these factors. Genuine self-expression as well as self-control demands a full view of reality, which is decidedly absent from the conception of life under consideration. The Scholastic scheme of life has its origin in experience, in so far as it originates from the situations in which men act. But experience is merely the matter out of which man comes to arrive at the ultimate good of life. It by no means dominates the entire system as it does in Pragmatism. Reason acting upon the data of experience can rise from a knowledge of visible creation to the certain knowledge of the existence of God, the origin and the end of all things. The existence of God is the fundamental truth on which the Scholastics base the structure of ethics, and it is the ultimate and proper motive of the activity of the will. Man is urged by an irresistible impulse of his nature to seek happiness; in God he finds the true knowledge which frees him from every evil and leads him to the possession of every obtainable good. Perfect happiness, as is clear, is unattainable in the present life; it is a gift which is reserved for man in a future life, if man accepts and follows the conditions laid down. Accepting then the truth of God's existence, it follows that all earthly happiness finds its highest meaning in so far as it is well ordered in reference to what is God's will as manifested by reason and revelation. Man is assisted in arriving at the knowledge of the Divine Will by reflection and by instruction. Thereupon he comes to the knowledge of the highest principles of action and to the most impelling motives for applying those principles to the concrete situations of life. As God is the source of human life and its final end, and inasmuch as life is interpreted and made meaningful in Him, it follows that human actions are to be evaluated in the

⁵¹ Morris R. Cohen, "Later Philosophy," *The Cambridge History of American Literature*, III, P. II, 256.

light of the Divine Will as manifested in reason and revelation. In other words, morality cannot be separated from religion, from the service of God, the Divine Will, and the principles that flow from the intimate and close relations which the creature should have with his Creator and Rewarder.⁵² Dewey, of course, would reject all this because he denies man's divine origin and destiny, in fact everything which is supernatural. In doing so he fails to consider the ultimate foundation of morals, and gives a very imperfect account of life as well as depriving it of its highest motives.

The system of ethics proposed by Dewey gives no place to a hierarchy of values among goods. A discrimination would be against his explanation of democracy, his theory of knowledge, and his psychology. He rebels against superiority and considers it the source of the social ills of the past and of the present. Democracy then becomes for him the vital process which, in so far as it is negative, sets aside whatever may lead to superiority; and which, from the positive side, tends to establish the equality of man. A distinction in moral goods he seems to fear would lead to distinctions of importance, of rank and dignity, to the establishment of classes. Again, his epistemology makes impossible any fixed, stable, and universal criterion by which various goods may be objectively evaluated. He denies, for instance, the separate and distinct existence of mind and the world in the intellectual order, and the distinction of spiritual and corporeal in the moral order. Psychologically, he sets aside any distinction between soul and body, between higher nature and lower nature, and denies, in conformity with Behaviorism, the freedom of the human will. Freedom is not looked upon by him as the acceptance of the good and rejection of what is evil, but the liberation of activity from whatever hems it in. But, as we have hitherto contended, activity requires a criterion of evaluation, lest it becomes activity for the sake of activity alone. Some actions are not to be liberated, and man is bound to check them by self-control, which is the counterpoise of self-expression. It goes without saying that individual and social life would be better were some ideas and thoughts corrected before being allowed to exteriorize themselves. The moral criterion therefore is necessary in evaluating activity.

⁵² Cf. V. Cathrein, "Ethics," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, V, 562.

The science of ethics deals with the establishment of the general principles which guide the deliberate activity of man. There is no one special area of life which is marked off and designated as moral. All the deliberate activities of man, in his relations to himself, to his fellowman, and to God, are subject to the moral law. Morality does not consist, as Dewey often shows, in cultivating a few virtues, but pertains to the whole of man's life. The science upon which morality is based is the reasoned plan of ordering the whole of life in view of the ultimate end of life. The Scholastics make the ultimate end of life the possession of eternal bliss, which is the highest good man can attain. In the light of the *summum bonum* every activity is made meaningful for its acquirement. For Dewey, the process of growth is the highest good; and no one good is sufficient in itself but is of value only in so far as it contributes to the active process of growth. We might accept this with the qualification—that every good must contribute to a ceaseless growth towards God. With Dewey, however, it seems to be growth for the sake of growth,⁵³ which we consider to be very misleading and deceiving because it neglects the directive power that comes from the moral law.

The ceaseless growth towards God, which we consider the highest purpose of existence, requires in strict interpretation that everything in life be made a means to spiritual growth. Consequently all goods, such as health, economic security, art, science, and the like are all means of spiritual advancement. This leads to the distinction of spiritual and corporeal goods which Mr. Dewey would reject, for he places all goods on the same level. He says: "Anything that in a given situation is an end and good at all is of equal worth, rank, and dignity with every other good of any other situation and deserves the same intelligent attention."⁵⁴ We admit that intelligent attention is due to every good, but it is certain that men give more intelligent attention to some goods than to others; generally they are more concerned and intelligent when something is a necessity than when it is a luxury; they attend more to what is substantial than what is accidental; they give more intelligent attention to

⁵³ Cf. W. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, the Protagonist of Democracy," *Journal of Philosophy*, XVIII (June, 1921), 315-316.

⁵⁴ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 176.

the selection of a profession in life than they do to the selection of some article of personal attire. They distinguish between spiritual and corporeal goods; then, the "lower and sensual should be subordinated to the higher and intellectual; for though the craving for the sensual may be stronger, the satisfaction that comes from the intellectual is vastly more extensive, more lasting, more productive of good to the individual and society and fraught with no evil consequences."⁵⁵ This is in accord with the Scholastic doctrine of mind which, from a consideration of its operations and formal objects, maintains that mind or intellect is spiritual. The distinctions of spiritual and corporeal do not fit in with the Pragmatic theory which restricts the activity of mind to the sensible. The intellect in its evaluation of all life comes to the knowledge of essentials and supplies the will with the highest motives for the attainment of the highest good. The attainment of the highest good is the center about which all lesser and fleeting goods rotate, and in which a hierarchy of goods is possible.⁵⁶

We cannot accept Dewey's exposition of morality, because:

- (1) He fails to provide those fixed principles, aims, and ideals which flow from the conception of the whole life; in other words, he fails to provide a normative science for human actions.
- (2) He rejects all considerations of the supernatural, of the transcendent, of the universal, and of the fixed in life.
- (3) His inordinate emphasis upon action defeats an ideal of progress because it neglects fundamentals.
- (4) He errs in making ethics altogether social in origin, and in his exposition seems to make individual utility and satisfaction the basic criteria of human activity.
- (5) He fails to recognize the need for self-control in human life.
- (6) He fails to provide a hierarchy of values among goods.

It is easily seen that these defects in Dewey's ethical theory will be reflected in his political theory. This is true of both aspects of democracy which he extols. Cooperation, to be genuine and rich in effect, demands high moral character in its participants. As cooperative experiences may be harmful as well as helpful, destructive as well as constructive, some cri-

⁵⁵ Thomas V. Moore, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 158-159. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1926.

⁵⁶ Cf. James J. Fox, "Good," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, VI, 638-639.

terion is demanded by which we may know what we ought to share with others as well as what we ought not to share. If we are to increase the number of points of shared interest, the task is one of evaluating what are ideal interests. Dewey, in his advocacy of change and reconstruction, is not content with social life as it is, but it cannot be clearly gathered from his works in just what the relief of the human estate consists. We conceive the democratic society to be given to solidarity as well as to change, and hence it needs the approved values of the past and present which a full view of life presents. Its specific task is to maintain the solidarity of the social fabric while introducing well-advised changes. Dewey's devotion to the experimental method blinds him to the fixed and final in human life and tends to encourage all sorts of theories which would act as working hypotheses in the interests of progress. But not all social theories, no more than all human impulses, have a right to serious consideration. Sheldon considers that "his teaching therefore will work—has already worked—in the direction of extreme radicalism and a fanatic devotion to change of the social fabric."⁵⁷ In his rejection of superiority as the root of all social evils Dewey tends to make all men equal in the contribution to be made to political life. A counterpart of this tendency is to minimize the importance of authority in civil society and to make equal the rôle which every one is to play in matters pertaining to the body politic. This is, however, basically a fallacy, since all men are not equal in the contributions to be made to civil policy. Men are not equal intellectually, morally, or socially, or in any other way, save in one profoundly philosophical and religious. Just as in private life ultimate basic concerns are to be the guides in directing particular situations, so also are they to be guides in meeting particular social and political situations. Men differ in capacity for determining general principles and goals; consequently some are leaders and others followers, although such position is not true in every instance. Democratic society cannot well do away with the claims of its superior members. It welcomes but does not equate the contributions to government of all its participants. It can prize the contributions of its most gifted members, while appre-

⁵⁷ W. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, the Protagonist of Democracy," *Journal of Philosophy*, XVIII (June, 1921), 317.

ciating the gifts of all. In this way it makes use of what all have to give in accord with the capacity of each and every one. Democracy advances when it recognizes the basic fundamental principles, fixed truths, and ends which all its participants apply according to their capacity for the sound progress which it esteems. Authority also has a definite place in civil society in so far as just laws are necessary to protect honest people in the discharge of their duties and aid them in the full development of personality. Cooperation requires the idealization of experiences to be shared, and reconstruction has its foundations deep in a well thought out philosophy of life.

Our task in this chapter has been to compare in fundamental points the ideal of life proposed by John Dewey with the ideal of life proposed by Scholastic philosophy. The latter was taken as the proper basis of comparison, for it is deservedly characterized as the "*philosophia perennis*," the philosophy "*sub specie aeternitatis*." We began by saying that Mr. Dewey addresses himself to the task of formulating a new ideal of life because of the advances in democracy, science, and industry. Then, after indicating what, for our purposes, constitutes the ideal of life, the central theme about which the discussion proceeded was that of the problem of knowledge, which the author we are studying makes the greatest effect of the changes up to the present. We found that this was defective in regard to the two chief problems of epistemology, viz., what we know, and the validity of what we know. Accordingly, Mr. Dewey's explanation of the prime questions of life, the origin, nature and destiny of man was discovered to manifest antipodal differences with that of Scholasticism; the one postulates an origin of evolutionism, the other requires an origin of creationism; the first makes man a little higher than the animal; the second makes man a little less than the angels; the destiny of man in the one is earthly, in the other, heavenly. Scholasticism, in direct contrast with Pragmatism, concerns itself with the problems of philosophers as the sound basis for dealing adequately with the problems of men. It supplants a philosophy of activity by a philosophy of the whole of reality which evaluates, directs, and sponsors activity; it recognizes the rôle of self-control in life as well as of self-expression. The world view which we entertain provides those general truths,

universal principles, and fixed ends, which applied to individual, social, and political life, form that substantial basis of orientation necessary for properly attending to the relief of human estate, for the reconstruction of democratic life. These deficiencies of Dewey's ideal of life will be manifest in his ideal of education, inasmuch as the ideal of life determines the ideal of education.

CHAPTER III

JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF EDUCATION

THE SCHOOL AND MODERN LIFE

The complete rupture with tradition, so characteristic of Mr. Dewey's ideal of life, finds its counterpart in his ideal of education. He places his philosophy of change in the very center of education, and about it he gathers those fundamental principles which are designed to perpetuate change. "Nothing is, but is ever becoming" is the old expression of his doctrine. He would have us believe that we have entered upon a period of perpetual flux, of ever more rapid dynamic change. Throughout this process, his attention is arrested by its operation, by its functioning aspect. His books abound in excursions into its "how," almost wholly neglectful of its "what" and of its end results. The while we may reject as incompatible with a total view of reality his conception of the origin, meaning, and end of life, such a position does not necessarily entail a rejection of all his educational principles or practices. It is clear that we can accept the facts of experiment, while rejecting the Philosophy of Experimentalism.

Dr. Dewey is convinced that the traditional school does not articulate well with our changing environment. The following statements are typical:

"The obvious fact is that our social life has undergone a thorough and radical change. If our education is to have any meaning for life, it must pass through an equally complete transformation."

"It is radical conditions which have changed, and only an equally radical change in education suffices."

"That this revolution (i. e., the industrial) should not affect education in other than formal and superficial fashion is inconceivable."

"The modification going on in the method and curriculum of education is as much a product of the changed social situation, and as much an effort to meet the needs of the new society that is forming, as are changes in modes of industry and commerce."¹

It would be folly to deny the widespread changes that have come over American life. They are so obvious that he who runs may read. It would be folly also to deny the intensive demands that are now made upon the school. The history of education makes it plain that as civilization becomes more complex, the School must assume greater obligations.

The diminution of the rôle played by informal education in the life of children and the manifold, hitherto unmet, problems consequent upon the industrial revolution have thrown an almost unbearable onus upon the schools of the nation. The time was, a few generations ago, when the household supplied a distinct and extensive education. Mr. Dewey explains well the activities of the household prior to the development of the factory when he says: "The clothing worn was for the most part not only made in the house, but the members of the household were generally familiar with the shearing of the sheep, the carding and spinning of the wool, and the plying of the loom. Instead of pressing a button and flooding the house with electric light, the whole process of getting illumination stood revealed in its toilsome length, from the killing of the animal and the trying of fat, to the making of wicks and dipping of candles. The supply of flour, of lumber, of foods, of building materials, of household furniture, even of metal ware, of nails, hinges, hammers, etc., was in the immediate neighborhood, in shops which were constantly open to inspection and often centers of neighborhood congregation. The entire industrial process stood revealed, from the production on the farm of the raw materials, till the finished article was actually put to use."² The children participated in these domestic duties according as they increased in age, ever assuming more obligations. The interest in such activities was intense; and without doubt as a result of the contact with such impelling life situations, the child's repertoire of skills, habits, and knowledge increased with an amazing rapidity. These activities, filled as they were with opportunities for learning, have

¹ *The School and Society*, pp. 43, 25, 22, 20.

² *The School and Society*, p. 23.

passed. The school is to supply at least the equivalent, or something more worthwhile. Incidentally, though the modern home has outgrown responsibilities of another day, it is not absolved from the duty of contributing to the cause of education. It has its share, and very important it is, in the task of inculcating in the child's mind and heart the philosophy of life, true and wholesome, preserving and advancing our honored heritage of democracy.

In our advanced civilization, present demands are inspiring opportunities for betterment. The task of education becomes more important. It would be nonsense to wish for the return of the "good old days" which were in many respects defective in the full enrichment of life now open to all. Education's task is greater; there are dangers on every side, but its latent possibilities are driving motives for men. True education saves civilization. H. G. Wells says somewhere that civilization is a race between education and catastrophe. If education be neglected for a generation, or if it become mortally infected, the crash is sure to come.

As on the one hand, formal education is deprived of that important contribution coming from the household, so on the other hand its difficulties are multiplied by the unique demands of modern life. There are demands of civic life, of economic life, of family life, and of recreational life, that press closely for attention. There are new moral problems; there is urgent necessity for a solid religious foundation.

The question naturally arises, what are the schools doing to supply the defect arising in informal education and to meet the demands of expanding life? It is a common objection that the school is slow in meeting the new demands crowding in upon it. It has been compared to a "lazy giant," unawakened to its responsibilities and opportunities. Sociologists lay it down as a principle that it is the tendency of institutions to resist change. Applying this to the school, it means that the school as an institution tends to perpetuate its traditional type of curriculum, course of study, method, organization, etc. It seems to glory in the achievements, in the constitution of bygone days. Our commonly taught elementary school course of study has been modified by insistent demands coming from parents, or others interested in the cause of education. But the change over a period

of years consisted only in the addition of new subjects to the course of study, as exemplified in the introduction of music, drawing, nature study, home economics, physical education, and manual arts. The change has been quantitative, rather than qualitative. It necessitated a restriction of time given to time-honored form- and content-subjects, but lacked organizing principles under the direction of which every detail of subject-matter, method, etc., would be accounted for.

THE TRADITIONAL SCHOOL

Mr. Dewey, keenly conscious of the changing American life, scathingly denounces the traditional type of school. In its entire workings, it is for him a relic of another age, useful perhaps under an old order, but a hindrance, a positive detriment, under the new. He considers society barnacled and oppressed by the traditional course of studies and methods. A consideration of the traditional education and the new education becomes necessary as an introduction to an understanding of his principles of education and the ideal of social efficiency in a democracy. The record of his complaints against the old education indicates what he considers as strains upon democracy demanding alleviation by sound thought and action.

Dr. Dewey enumerates "three things about the old-fashioned school which must be changed if schools are to reflect modern society; first, the subject-matter, second, the way the teacher handles it, and third, the way the pupils handle it." Obviously, a radical change in any one of these three things, means a radical change in the other two. ["The subject-matter of the school room must be enlarged to take in the new elements and needs of society. This can be done without overburdening the pupils by effecting the second and third necessary changes . . . The function of the teacher must change from that of cicerone and dictator to that of a watcher and helper." ³ The rôle of the child becomes active instead of passive; he becomes the questioner and experimenter rather than one who merely memorizes and gives back information on the teacher's request.]

The activity of the new schools is to supplant the "passivity" of the traditional school. The new education glorifies method,

³ *Schools of To-morrow*, pp. 170, 171, 172.

the old education, subject-matter. The new education aims at securing living motivation from the spontaneous activity of the child. The old-fashioned school, in its devotion to subject-matter rather than to pupils, was forced to have recourse to external incentives for the purpose of promoting learning. It was at best, then, highly artificial. From its exceeding devotion to what was to be learned rather than to the learner, Mr. Dewey says, several evils proceeded. The following are to be noted among others: The traditional school neglected the principle of apperception by its insistence upon subject-matter rather than method. It made instruction mechanical and dead. It led to parrot-like, meaningless repetitions, and employed constant drilling and examination to force pupils to develop an interest in a routine or mechanical procedure. Rewards and high marks were introduced as artificial stimulations of learning.⁴ Fear, emulation, rivalry, the feeling of superiority were all egoistic motives emerging from the practices of the old education. Again, tests and measurements are devices of the old school in which marks, grading, classes, and promotions are important. The traditional motives of study and schemes of classification have little place in the "new" education, for the important things are "freedom, individuality, activity, and a cooperative social medium."⁵

These defects of the old education are regarded as the outcome of the separation of mind and body. This is indicated by the following quotation: "The separation of the activity of the mind from the activity of the senses in direct observation and from the activity of the hand in construction and manipulation, makes the material of the studies academic and remote, and compels the passive acquisition of information imparted by textbook and teacher."⁶

Before entering upon an explanation of the "New Education," we should note the fact that differences in philosophical interpretation do not imply any neglect of experimental procedure. Improvements in method, for example, supported by objective data, and proceeding from any school of thought, are welcomed by others. American life requires such appreciation of others as

⁴ Cf. *The Child and the Curriculum*, pp. 31-38; *Schools of To-morrow*, pp. 297-298.

⁵ *Progressive Education and the Science of Education*, p. 4.

⁶ *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 238; cf. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 87.

recognizes and delights in contributions to procedure that will make more meaningful the work of education. In the meanwhile, experimentalists vary in the final interpretation of the facts and processes which are made available for expediting the work of education; it would be undemocratic to despise the wealth of information arising from activities of all schools.

The change, which Mr. Dewey believes comes into education with the applications of principles consonant with advances in the experimental sciences, and conformable to political growth, is likened by him to the revolution inaugurated by the discoveries of Copernicus when the astronomical center shifted from the earth to the sun. He places the center of gravity of education where it belongs—in the child, about whom all the appliances of education revolve.⁷ In fact, every system of education must recognize that it is with the child's present equipment that every plan for personal and social advancement must begin. Education must conform to the nature of the child, to his mental and moral and physical life here and now constituted. The new must be welded with the old; the principle of apperception can never be lost sight of. What the child knows, thinks, and feels, is the starting point for the introduction of new ideas and ideals, for the assimilation of valuable habits to control and direct his life.

THE "NEW" EDUCATION

A visitor to the "new" school cannot but be impressed by the many changes which have come over educational practice as exhibited in them. Mr. Dewey is unquestionably the leader in the new movement. A thoroughgoing acceptance of the new organization obtains in about five per cent of the schools of our nation. The new schools are radically different from the schools of the past. The visitor's attention would be arrested by the very architectural beauty of the school building; he would observe that the school rooms are more attractive, more lightsome, more airy. The new school attempts to present the best conditions of the ideal home, and more: the real learning which comes from free association with other children from a variety of homes. There is a change in the atmosphere of the school. There is more movement in the new school; less or no regimentation. The

⁷ Cf. *The School and Society*, p. 51.

children talk with one another as they do in out-of-school life. They approach and converse with the teacher more easily and confidently than children under another system. The new school gives the impression that it attempts to make the work of education as informal as possible. There is much less sitting at desks; the so-called "listening" desks have practically disappeared, and in their stead have come tables accommodated to the height and suited for the activities of the children. A multiplicity of activities greets the visitor. The children are sewing, weaving, cooking, working with hammer and nails, with wood, in clay, or with leather, conducting stores and banks, debating, acting plays, etc.

The Instrumental theory of truth finds its educational expression in the well known phrase "learning by doing." Accepting the scientific hypothesis of evolution, it regards mind as the resultant expression of a long series of biological forces of variation and selection. Thinking becomes a necessity of survival. It is not so much that man is capable of thought, but rather that survival itself demands thinking. Exigencies of living in a democratic society postulate the need of closer and more accurate thinking than in a type of society where one does the thinking, and others acquiesce. Instrumentalism respects no permanent deposit of truth, save perhaps its own underlying principles; i. e., in so far, for instance, as it would consider truth ever in the process of being made, subject to revision, and always particular and contingent. The great ideal extolled is that of meeting adequately the needs of the present situation. The rôle of the pupil, of subject-matter, and of the teacher in the "new" education will now be considered.

Child activity in accord with the theory of Instrumentalism is made the center about which the entire educational process revolves. Everything else in school finds its meaning in pupil activity, the curriculum, course of studies, organization, motivation, etc. It is inextricably bound up in the determination of subject-matter, and with the place of the teacher in the school. Accordingly, the explanation of these factors will make the ideal of activity clearer. The principle of authority as operating in the life of the child is rejected. The reason is that a philosophy of change holds progress to be incompatible with thoroughgoing acceptance of prevalent ideals. If there be nothing permanent

in experience, no guarantee exists that the on-coming generation will accept our ideals. The exigencies of a new life may rather call for a complete reversal. This characteristic dominates Dewey's philosophy. Educationally it is at the basis of the thought, "Every generation must redefine these terms (character, information, discipline, culture), for itself, if they are to retain vitality."⁸ The principle of "learning by doing," of the children meeting in school the demands and needs of their nature, brings to the front also Mr. Dewey's now famous epigram: "Education . . . is a process of living and not a preparation for future living."⁹ The on-going process of growing is the important thing. While the "passive" school glorified the outcome of growth, the "active" school glorifies the process of growing.

The emphasis placed upon child activity, it is maintained, gives the proper solution for the organization of subject-matter. The psychological is to precede the logical. Subject-matter is psychologized when it is taken and developed within the range and scope of the child's life. The presentation is adapted to the child's apperceptive mass, as against the training possessed by an expert, capable of dealing with logical formulations. To quote from Mr. Dewey: Subject-matter is psychologized when it is "viewed as an outgrowth of present tendencies and activities"; "when it possesses its origin and bearing in a growing experience." Further, the logical organization is subject-matter considered in itself, while the psychological is subject-matter in relation to the child. "A psychological statement of experience follows its actual growth; it is historic; it notes steps actually taken, the uncertain and tortuous, as well as the efficient and successful. The logical point of view, on the other hand, assumes that the development has reached a certain positive stage of fulfilment. It neglects the process and considers the outcome. It summarizes and arranges, and thus separates the achieved results from the actual steps by which they were forthcoming in the first instance."¹⁰ By means of the psychological organization, any obstacle, intellectual, practical or ethical, can be localized and turned over until the pupil masters it. The logical is the end result, the last point in the series of present activities,

⁸ *The Educational Situation*, p. 92.

⁹ *My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 7.

¹⁰ *The Child and the Curriculum*, pp. 32, 37, 25.

the summation and evaluation of previous attempts. The logical organization, "serves as a guide to future experience; it gives direction; it facilitates control; it economizes effort, preventing useless wandering, and pointing out the paths which lead most quickly and most certainly to a desired result."¹¹ Interest emerges as a result of such arrangement of psychological and logical.¹²

In the new schools there is no logical, made-in-advance, course of studies. This follows from the subserving of the needs and opportunities of children. An expression of this principle may be observed in the following quotation: "If we identify ourselves with the real instincts and needs of childhood, and ask only after its fullest assertion and growth, the discipline and information and culture of adult life shall all come in their due season."¹³ The demands of some organized body of knowledge seem to induce Mr. Dewey to make a concession in this regard. Speaking of projects he writes: "Progressive teachers may and can work out and present to other teachers for trial and criticism definite and organized bodies of knowledge, together with a listing of sources from which additional information of the same sort can be secured."¹⁴ Fearful perhaps lest this should be construed as "adult imposition," he hastens to differentiate such organization from traditional text-books. "If it is asked how the presentation of such bodies of knowledge would differ from the standardized texts of traditional schools, the answer is easy. In the first place, the material would be associated with and derived from occupational activities or prolonged courses of action undertaken by the pupils themselves. In the second place, the material presented would not be something to be literally followed by other teachers and students, but would be indications of the intellectual possibilities of this and that course of activity—statements on the basis of carefully directed and observed experience of the questions that have arisen in connection with them and of the kind of information found useful in answering them, and of where that knowledge can be had." Further "Progressive schools . . . are under the necessity of finding proj-

¹¹ *The Child and the Curriculum*, p. 27; cf. *How We Think*, pp. 56-63; *Democracy and Education*, pp. 256-261.

¹² *The Child and the Curriculum*, p. 35.

¹³ *The School and Society*, p. 71.

¹⁴ *Progressive Education and the Science of Education*, p. 12.

ects which involve an orderly development and inter-connection of subject-matter, since otherwise there can be no sufficiently complex and long-span undertaking."¹⁵ It is to be observed that such an organization of projects is to be from "occupational activities or prolonged courses of action undertaken by the pupils themselves." The teacher's part, as we shall see subsequently, is in providing the environment from which such occupational activities or prolonged courses of action (not courses of study), will be gathered.

The varied features of such prolonged courses of action or vocational activities are indicated in the following quotation: "An education which acknowledges the full intellectual and social meaning of a vocation would include instruction in the historic background of present conditions; training in science to give intelligence and initiative in dealing with material and agencies of production; and study of economics, civics, and politics, to bring the future worker into touch with the problems of the day and the various methods proposed for its improvement. Above all, it would train power of readaptation to changing conditions so that future workers would not become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon them."¹⁶ It is to be noted that the above selection enumerates what may be broadly called vocational history, science, economics, civics, and politics. There are some subjects omitted from the list, as health, literature, art, music, and religion. Some of the omissions are perhaps unintentional. The important thing to be noted is that the curriculum gives expression to what constitutes the cultured vocationalist. Mr. Dewey attempts in his educational theory to integrate, in accord with democracy, labor and leisure.

The teacher's part in conformity with the self-activity curriculum "is to furnish the environment which stimulates responses and directs the learner's course."¹⁷ Under the traditional régime the teacher was active, the pupils passive. Now the process is reversed, the child leads in activity and the teacher's rôle is to keep himself out of relation with the pupil as much as possible, and allow the full and free expression of the real instincts of the child.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Democracy and Education*, p. 372.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

It is the teacher's business to provide the environment from whence the subject-matter of the school is to arise. The activities which are elicited on the part of the pupil will be of direct concern to him, and will reflect the activities of the larger life of which the school is a part. Subject-matter thus conceived will be made up of the demands and needs of the existing community life. It is divided into two classes: first, subject-matter that is essential; and second, subject-matter that is secondary. The things which are socially most fundamental, i. e., which have to do with experiences in which the widest groups share, are the essentials. The things which represent the needs of specialized groups and technical pursuits are secondary.¹⁸

The children propose the problem, in the thoroughly consistent interpretation of the system, and the teacher makes suggestions. The pupils are not to receive knowledge on the authority of the teacher. The following quotation from Rousseau's *Emile*, adopted by Dewey, shows the status of the teacher's authority: "Give him (the pupil) no orders at all, absolutely none. Do not even let him think that you claim any authority over him. Let him know only that he is weak and you are strong, that his condition and yours puts him at your mercy; let this be perceived, learned and felt. Let him early find upon his proud neck the heavy yoke which nature has imposed upon us, the heavy yoke of necessity, under which every finite being must bow. Let him find the necessity in things, not in the caprices of man; let the curb be the force of conditions, not authority."

The teacher is to respect the freedom of the pupil. It is explained thus: "But liberty for the child is the chance to test all impulses and tendencies on the world of things and people in which he finds himself, sufficiently to discover their character so that he may get rid of those which are harmful, and develop those which are useful to himself and others. . . . Give a child freedom to find out what he can and cannot do, both in the way of what is physically possible and what his neighbors will stand for, and he will not waste much time on impossibilities but will bend his energies to the possibilities."¹⁹ The teacher's part consists in supplying the medium with such a variety of instruments, appliances, etc., that action will result on the part of the pupils,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁹ *Schools of To-morrow*, pp. 135, 138-139.

for it is their business to act, not primarily to study or to learn;²⁰ learning will ensue from conflict with real situations. Activity supplants the accumulation of facts.

The virtues of the new school are the "positive virtues—energy, initiative, and originality—qualities that are worth more to the world than even the most perfect faithfulness in carrying out orders." These are to take the place of the virtues of the traditional school, viz., "the colorless, negative virtues of obedience, docility, and submission."²¹ The former are the virtues of democracy; the latter are traits needed in an aristocratic state, while in a democracy "they interfere with successful conduct of society and government."

Motivation in the new education consists in identifying the self with the activity under way.²² The intensity of interest indicates the genuineness of the discipline accruing. The evidence of being properly interested is the continuity of attention to the work in hand. Interest is stimulated and sustained by coping with problems personally suggested. The ideal is to be immediately interested in what one is now doing; if not, interest is aroused by seeing the end in the beginning. This is said to be not the hard pedagogy of doing what you do not like, nor the soft pedagogy of doing what you like, but the new pedagogy of liking what you do. The new education embodies the effort to secure living motivation from the activity of children exerted upon subject-matter.

The comparison of the new school with the traditional school indicates the complete rupture that it has made with tradition. The emerging system is not to be considered as the perfection of the old; for it is a complete rejection of the old in its various expressions. Mr. Dewey makes out a complete case against previous practice. Our description of the new school indicated its revolutionary principles. We shall continue by presenting the ideal of education from whence these principles flow. Criticism of the cardinal principles of the new education is reserved for the last chapter.

²⁰ *Progressive Education and the Science of Education*, p. 13.

²¹ *Schools of To-morrow*, pp. 297-298.

²² Cf. *Interest and Effort in Education*, pp. 17 ff.

THE ULTIMATE IDEAL OF EDUCATION

The following quotation seems to summarize the characteristics of the "new" education: The school is organized on an ethical basis when it represents, "in its own spirit, a genuine community life; in so far as what are called school discipline, government, order, etc., are the expression of this inherent social spirit; in so far as the methods used are those that appeal to the active and constructive powers, permitting the child to give out and thus to serve; in so far as the curriculum is so selected and organized as to provide the material for affording the child a consciousness of the world in which he has to play a part, and the demands he has to meet."²³ The most generic designation of the ideal of education from which such characteristics proceed would be perhaps that of child activity in a provided social medium. Social spirit, discipline, method, curriculum, etc., flow from the actions of children upon the occupational activities of the larger community life.

It is not to be taken that Pragmatism furnishes a universal and fixed aim of educational endeavor. We have already seen that it looks to the process, and not to the outcome of the process. Its chief concern is with method rather than with subject-matter that is final, disposed of once for all, and universally valid for all times. In fact it denies that there are truths, principles, or ideals that are always and everywhere valid. When we speak of its ultimate ideal, we exclude such a universality. Perhaps it would be proper to say that the universal and fixed ideal of Pragmatic Education is its dedication to what is particular and changing.

It is given to aims or ends that proceed from felt difficulties in the social environment. It has no consideration for remote or ultimate ends. Action and growth are emphasized as a result of interaction with environment. Mr. Dewey lays down the following criteria of a good aim: (1) "The aim set up must be an outgrowth of existing conditions. It must be based upon a consideration of what is already going on; upon the resources and difficulties of the situation." (2) "An aim must, then, be *flexible*; it must be capable of alteration to meet circumstances. An end established externally to the process of action is always rigid."

²³ *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 44.

(3) "The aim must always represent the freeing of activities."²⁴ An aim therefore arises out of felt difficulties of the situation with which one is concerned; is flexible, and represents the freeing of activities.

The aim is always in the process, according to this explanation; an external aim is regarded as always rigid. The process is democracy; an examination of what democracy is will help in the understanding of the aim of education. The ideal of democracy is Dewey's ideal of life and of education.

Democracy is the social force which promotes the intermingling of all the peoples. Unlike an aristocracy, it cannot survive with fixed classes, which prevent intermingling. "It is fatal for a democracy to permit the formation of fixed classes. Differences of wealth, the existence of large masses of unskilled laborers, contempt for work with the hands, inability to secure the training which enables one to forge ahead in life, all operate to produce classes, and to widen the gulf between them."²⁵ The essence of democracy is a revolution of change as opposed to the static condition of an aristocracy. Its standards are different. "Particularly is it true that a society which not only changes but which has the ideal of such change as will improve it, will have different standards and methods of education from one which aims simply at the perpetuation of its own customs." Democratic society, intentionally progressive, aims at a greater variety of mutually shared interests to counteract the rigidity and isolation arising from fixed classes. Democracy is an expression of the ideal society, "in which every person shall be occupied in something which makes the lives of others better worth living, and which accordingly makes the ties which bind closely together more perceptible, which breaks down the barriers of distance between them." The concept of associated living is the ideal of democracy. Interaction and reconstruction, in fine, are its two special traits. Democracy "signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control." It likewise signifies "not only freer interaction between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could keep up a separation) but change in social habit—its

²⁴ *Democracy and Education*, pp. 121-124.

²⁵ *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 313.

continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterizes a democratically constituted society.”²⁶

These two traits find further expression in what may be called Dewey's Ultimate Aim of all education. The generally accepted formulation of his aim is expressed in the terms “social efficiency.” For further precision he would require the addition of the kind of social order; then the expression becomes “social efficiency in a democracy,” differentiating it from social efficiency in any other type of society. The difficulty met with in attempting to indicate in an exact phrase just what is the final expression, arises from his words: “There is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education.” “The educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end.” He considers it futile to try “to establish the aim of education—some one final aim which subordinates all others to itself.” It appears that he has a dread of anything approaching a fixed aim as unfitted to his concept of democracy; it would smack of embodying a body of principles that may come to be regarded as being of the nature of external authorization or imposition. From the nature of the life process, consisting of the social environment, taken broadly as the medium in which individuals operate, and the operation of the individual himself, two formulations of the aim are proposed. Keeping constant the part of the individual in the life process, the determinant aim of education is “social efficiency in a democracy.” Viewed from the contribution of the individual it finds its expression in the phrase “reconstruction of experience.” The one expresses the social aspect of education, the other the individualistic aspect. It will be noted that they correspond to the two traits of democracy indicated above, interaction and reconstruction. “Social efficiency as an educational purpose should mean cultivation of power to join freely and fully in shared or common activities.” The second expression of aim is as follows: “The idea of education advanced in these chapters is formally summed up in the idea of the continuous reconstruction of experience.” Education “is the reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experi-

²⁶ *Democracy and Education*, pp. 94-106.

ence, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.”²⁷

Social efficiency does not mean that the individual should feel, think, will, and act as the group feels, thinks, wills and acts. Such conformity may be predicated as belonging to an oligarchical society, but it is foreign to Dewey's conception of the relations of the individual to the group. While the term “social” includes industrial competency and civic efficiency in a broad sense, ultimately it means that all resources of society are at the disposal of the individual for advancing the cause of society. The individual receives something from society, and his contribution is to equal at least what he has received. The social stream brings along opportunity for associated experience for every one, and its volume and force is affected by the reaction of its participants. It empties into each individual life, and continues its advances benefited by being reinforced by the vital action of those sharing in it. The school draws its resources from society; its policy, Dewey affirms, is determined by the peculiar problems disturbing the even continuity of the social fabric.

The child is to be socially efficient by being brought into contact by activity with the social environment, and is to make a social return for the opportunity for development of his capacities, particularly those in which he is distinctive. All his powers, interests, and habits are to be interpreted from the side of their social value. “These powers, interests, and habits must be continually interpreted—we must know what they mean. They must be translated into terms of their social equivalents—into terms of what they are capable of in the way of social service.”²⁸ “To foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers, so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion, is the way of social action.”²⁹

The rôle of the community in making the schools vital is just as important as the rôle of the school itself. It is a part of the social environment, and its interaction with the school gives the social context in which the schools operate. Isolation is deadly. The community presents the problems, i. e., subject-matter,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60; 130; 144; 90-91.

²⁸ *My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 6.

²⁹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 294.

whose solution the school seeks in advancing social life. The school is to draw its activities from the occupations of the community. We must "make each one of our schools an embryonic community life, active with types of occupations that reflect the life of the larger society. . . . When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious."³⁰ Dewey's fundamental thesis in this regard is that occupations are to be the articulating centers of school life. The school as a whole is thus related to the community as a whole. In this larger aim of social efficiency Dewey thinks that meaning is given to the traditional aims of culture, discipline, harmonious development of the faculties, information, unfolding, etc.³¹

Time and again Dewey emphasizes growth as the ideal of education. The following passages will suffice to illustrate this statement: "It is assumed that the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education—or that the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth." "Since in reality there is nothing to which growth is relative save more growth, there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education." "Education is all one with growing; it has no end beyond itself. The criterion of the value of school education is the extent in which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies means for making the desire effective in fact."³²

From the technical formulations of the ideal of education as "social efficiency in a democracy," "reconstruction of experience," and "growth" flow the principles of the new education in regard to the pupil, subject-matter, and the teacher. Cooperation and reconstruction are the ultimate explanations of the work of the school.

Continually penetrating Dewey's conception of the ultimate aim of social efficiency is the deeper question of the relations of the individual to society. We shall continue to consider this question in the light of its relations to the ideal of social efficiency.

³⁰ *The School and Society*, p. 44.

³¹ Cf. *Democracy and Education*, p. 142-143; ch. V. *Moral Principles in Education*, pp. 11-13; 32. *The School and Society*, 30-31; 107.

³² *Democracy and Education*, pp. 117, 60, 62.

CHAPTER IV

A REVIEW OF JOHN DEWEY'S IDEAL OF EDUCATION

THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY

The primary question that must be properly exposed and evaluated in estimating the ideal of education proposed by Dewey is the one which has been suggested at the end of the previous chapter, that of the relations of the individual to the social order. The question is admittedly one of the most profound of social philosophy.¹ It penetrates the discussion of every text on educational philosophy; thus, the entire discussion of the volume, *Principles of Education*, by Messrs. Chapman and Counts, revolves about or proceeds from an examination of this question. They say explicitly that a program for the reform of education "must be based on patient study of the nature of the individual and of society."² The nature of the program, i. e., of the principles that are to govern the conduct of the school, is set forth only after an examination of the psychological and sociological foundations of education. Dewey says that the opposition between individual nature and social culture lies below all other divisions in pedagogic opinion.³ The problem of the relations of the individual to the social order is rendered particularly acute by the increasing demands of modern life. There are numerous political, industrial, social, and moral problems arising that demand for their solution the highest qualities of intelligence and morality, both in the individual and in the group. The importance of this question in education and in the whole of life makes it imperative that we examine carefully any solution proposed. Because of Mr. Dewey's prominence in the field of education his

¹ Joseph A. Leighton, *The Individual and the Social Order*, p. 355. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1926. Franz De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pedagogique*, p. 132. Brussels: Albert DeWit, 1927.

² J. Crosby Chapman and George S. Counts, *Principles of Education*, p. 51. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924.

³ *The Child and the Curriculum*, p. 8.

proposed method of solving this age-old enigma is particularly deserving of consideration.

To begin with we admit that the advent of democracy ushers in a period of greater stress upon individual thought and action. This is clearly gathered from the demands which arise from political changes. The people are, or should be, more concerned with the affairs of government than they were under another social order. Sovereignty now rests with all the people, and governmental authorities are responsible to the people for the management of the people's business. Power in government is delegated and responsible, as against power which is considered personal and irresponsible. Hence a change in the status of the individual with regard to the State arises by reason of political changes. People are not merely asked to be loyal citizens, but are bound to take an active interest in governmental matters. Likewise, the increasing demands of modern life, from whatever source they arise, necessitate more exacting thought on the part of the individual and of society. The questions naturally arise: Is the individual subject to society? Is society subject to the individual, or is there a higher synthesis in the light of which both the individual and society are to be guided in meeting the complex problems of modern life?

Dewey's position on the relation of the individual to society has been exposed in various ways in educational literature. De Hovre, who considers Dewey to be the chief defender of the "radical-social" doctrine of education, says: "The individual, with him, is completely absorbed in the social environment."⁴ Another writer explicitly remarks: "Dewey subordinates society to the individual in that he believes that the aim of education is to improve and progress the individual through activity, and thus make individuals better fitted to cope with later or future developments."⁵ The judgment of a recent author in regard to Dewey's stand may be gathered from the following quotation: "From a dozen points of view he (Dewey) overemphasizes the deliberate, conscious aspect of individual and social life, and in as many ways slurs over the value of habit, drill, and compulsion. The inevitable result is to discount the importance of the social

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

⁵ H. W. Handschy, "The Educational Theories of Cardinal Newman and John Dewey," *Education*, XLIX (Nov., 1928), 129.

heritage and to pour oil on the already dangerous fire of contemporaneous individualism.”⁶ Another writer considers that Dewey gives priority neither to individual, nor to society, but presents such an organic relation between the two that mutual advancement is made possible. He says: “Dewey . . . has worked out a consistent system of educational thought in which the advancement of the social process is always kept on a par with the development of the individual.”⁷

The varying opinions of writers in regard to Dewey's position are seen to embrace all possible explanations of the relations of the individual to society. Briefly, they are as follows: (1) society exists for the sake of individuals; (2) individuals must conform to social beliefs, social aims, and social ideals; (3) society and individuals are organically related to one another, society requiring the service and subordination of individuals and at the same time existing to serve them. Dewey, however, dismisses the question as being of no importance in meeting actual demands of social life. “These various theories suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situations are to be brought. . . . Not only does the solemn reiteration of categories of individual and organic or social whole not further these definite and detailed inquiries, but it checks them. It detains thought within pompous and sonorous generalities wherein controversy is as inevitable as it is incapable of solution.”⁸ Dewey's concern is not with what he would consider an idle manipulation of general concepts, diverting human capacity from the real questions at issue; it is rather with the concrete situations that demand concern and solution in the present emergency. What he wants is a release of human energy, resourcefulness, and ingenuity to cope with demands as they arise. Workable hypotheses are to meet challenging conflicts, instead of these latter, as he sees them, being covered up with disputes regarding general terms. The position of Dewey is in conformity with his general concept of not attempting to solve metaphysical questions which are regarded in

⁶ Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 478. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928.

⁷ Walter R. Smith, *Educational Sociology*, p. 60. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1928.

⁸ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 188, 198 f.

pragmatic philosophy, as incapable of being solved.⁹

Pragmatism has contributed a service to human thought by its continued insistence upon searching out and meeting quickly the problems that arise in social life. The demands of the present are vividly portrayed, and action in meeting them is the standard which it holds aloft. Deservedly it detests any indifference or apathy that may exist towards the vexatious exigencies multiplying in modern life. However, activity of the individual or of the group does not necessarily mean promotion of the general welfare. We shall proceed to consider our fundamental problem, that of the relation of the individual to society, under the following heading.

THE NEED FOR IDEALIZATION

Dewey defines society as the "*process* of associating in such ways that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are transmitted and made common. To this active process, both the individual and the institutionally organized may truly be said to be subordinate."¹⁰ The supreme task of all life is that of determining what "experiences, ideas, emotions, and values" are to be transmitted and made common. Association in "street gangs, schools for burglary, clans, social cliques, trade unions, joint stock corporations, villages,"¹¹ reveals clearly what a welter of conflicting experiences, ideas, etc., may emanate from group life. An examination of what we prefer to call the "vital process" will serve the purposes of indicating the conflicting aspects of individual and social life, and the consequent need for idealization.

The vital process has three aspects, viz., individualization, socialization, and idealization. The first exists in all those instances of life in which an individual expresses himself according to his own desires, plans, and ideals. It is in this way that he selects his sports, his recreational activities, etc. In a narrow sense, individualization is an expression of personal preference rather than approved social preference. The individual sets aside the command of the social group and establishes a personal norm of behavior. His action may spring from the impulsive drive,

⁹ Cf. *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, ch. VIII; *Democracy and Education*, ch. XXII.

¹⁰ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 207.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

personal interest, or personal ambition. It may be against the general welfare; it may be the expression of an idealizing tendency and in the end lead to the establishment of custom.

Individualization has its immediate source in what lies within us, "instincts, ambitions, limitations, doubts, scattered purposes, fragments of truth gathered into deceitful unities."¹² In an extreme form philosophically it is a rabid individualism, which makes man the measure of all things; politically, it finds an expression in anarchy, in the spurning of constituted authority. Even the term "liberty" as sometimes heralded, in the sense of liberty for myself, is an outcome of a false individualism. In economic life an extreme expression of a radical turn is the doctrine of governmental non-intervention in business. Radically, also, in education, individualism is found with those who exalt child needs and interests to the neglect of the values of the social heritage.

Socialization is the second aspect of the vital process made necessary by human association. It is difficult to keep the three aspects separate in as much as they belong to one process. The illustration of a stream comes to mind in connection with process suggested by its seemingly moving character. Idealization is then the direction of the stream, individualization is resistance to the stream, and socialization is the flow of the stream. Socialization, as a force of society, may be treated in a wide sense, in a narrow sense, and in respect to idealization. In its larger meaning, it includes all those advantages which arise by reason of social contacts. Its beginnings are in the home where the parents provide all the goods of life for the child; it is expanded by the widening circle of association, and accordingly the accomplishments of civilization are gradually brought within personal grasp. In a stricter sense, socialization begins when social preference is substituted for individual preference. Instead of following personal desire, or allowing the impulsive drive to exteriorize itself, social custom is accepted. The practice is clearly noticeable in social conventions, in which the individual gradually assumes society's patterns of action. It is exemplified in modes of dress, table etiquette, respect for women, etc. The penalty of repeated violations is social ostracism.

¹² Wm. J. Kerby, *The Social Mission of Charity*, p. 91. New York: Macmillan Co., 1924.

In its attitude towards the social order, socialization prefers stability to change. While the extreme individualist rages in his radicalism, the extreme conformist rests smugly in his conservatism. The one would tear down all existing institutions; the other would continue them forever in their present condition. The examples are extreme but the tendency is characteristic. In education the one scoffs at, while the other extols the social heritage. For the first, all value lies ahead; for the second, it is in the past. The motto of the individualist is always, "Forward!" That of the conformist is ever, "Caution!"

The larger social group tends to make over every individual in belief, feeling, and conduct, according to its principles and ideals. However, a check is placed upon its socializing influence by individualization and by the presence of smaller groups within the larger group. These groups socialize in turn, and their principles and ideals may be at variance with those of the larger group. Thus, political parties may be said to demand the conformity of the individual to the ideals of the party. Even the adherents of a very Liberal party would socialize in requiring the acceptance of liberal principles as a condition of admission. Gangs of bandits, etc., are imperious in their demands upon the individual and exact conformity under penalty of dire consequences. Labor unions, business organizations, athletic teams, in fact, all groups must socialize for their preservation. Socialization then comes to mean the domination of the life of the individual by the group to which he belongs. However, inasmuch as association is not limited to one group but applies to many, it is easy to understand how divergent viewpoints and varying loyalties arise. Confusion in individual life is to be expected because group life of itself gives no guarantee of the validity of its principles, ideals, etc.

Idealization is the third aspect of the vital process. Its task is to bring into harmony the conflicting tendencies and activities of the individual and the group. Its outlook is not narrowly conceived; indeed it is very broad, and from a consideration of the universe it brings ultimate principles, ideals, and motives to the solution of its task. Thus considered it is basically philosophical. The following definition of philosophy helps us to explain its nature: "The profound knowledge of the universal order, of the duties which that order imposes upon man, and of

the knowledge which man acquires from reality.”¹³ It is from the recognition of the knowledge, duties, and principles flowing from a study of the universal order that the counter processes of individualization and socialization are to be guided. Religion has a very important rôle, for it confirms and extends the findings of philosophy.

Individualization needs the idealism that comes from philosophy and religion. Every impulse, every desire, and every tendency of man requires the disciplining that proceeds from a full view of reality. Dr. Kerby expresses this thought when he says: “Every one of the interests that stirs us to action and forms the center of ambition must be viewed always through the discipline imposed upon it by the vision of all life.”¹⁴ It is by such a discipline that a genuine individualization arises to meet emergencies in all departments of life. Without it, action on pressing problems may be capricious and even destructive of the best attainments in life.

Socialization needs the idealism of a full vision of truth. Without the latter it tends to crush a wholesome and reasonable individualism; and it hurries on in the attempt to mould all individuals to present patterns of behavior. Idealization, likewise, disciplines the rival tendencies of the sub-groups in society. Amid the welter of conflicting experiences and emotions, it shows what are genuine and worthwhile. Some principles of life are accordingly corrected, others are condemned, and still others are indicated. Further, it promotes that understanding and toleration among sub-groups so highly prized in democratic society.

The idealization proceeding from philosophy and religion presents for us the answer to the question of the relations of the individual and society. Individualization needs a reasonable socialization, and vice versa. The idealizing process is the secure means of maintaining a sound equilibrium by directing and controlling these counter processes. Hence we say that the individual is not subject to society, nor is society subject to the individual; both find their true place in the idealization of philosophy and religion.

Such an idealization accounts in the last analysis for the

¹³ Desiré Card. Mercier, *Logique*, p. 23, quoted by M. De Wulf, *Catholic Encyclopedia*, XII, 26.

¹⁴ Wm. J. Kerby, *The Social Mission of Charity*, p. 84.

experiences, principles, motives, emotions, and ideals that are to be transmitted and made common in the school and in the larger life outside the school.

Our consideration of these three aspects of the vital process presents the proper setting for examining Mr. Dewey's position on the relations of the individual to society. He says, as quoted earlier, that "Society is the *process* of associating in such ways that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are transmitted and made common. To this active process the individual and the institutionally organized may truly be said to be subordinate." The existence of many societies, i. e., of sub-groups, precludes the possibility of securing harmony or unanimity of experiences, ideas, etc. Our exposition indicated the multiplicity of varying and oftentimes diametrically opposed experiences, ideas, etc., arising from associative life. Perhaps we can interpret these quotations from the point of view of the most excellent present practice, but again we are met with the difficulty of evaluating present practice. Subordination to the process of associating may furnish a clue. It suggests that individual and institutional life is advancing towards some definite goals. We cannot, however, expect a statement of what goals will be attained; otherwise an indication of the end rather than of the process would be given. Mr. Dewey does not tell us what the outcomes will be. It is reasonable to suppose that we will not find an answer in his pages because, if our interpretation is right, his philosophy does not presume to indicate what the outcome will be. Events may take such a definite turn that whatever is accepted today as well-established may be cast aside tomorrow.

We must have recourse to his ideal of life to determine the idealization which he presents. We cannot but recall in this connection our main findings in the study of his ideal of life. We gathered earlier that Mr. Dewey rejects the existence of universal and stable principles in the intellectual order and fixed and final goals in the moral order. We saw that his solution of the problem of knowledge led him to a restriction of the province of philosophy, and to the acceptance of a subjective and relative criterion of truth; we concluded that he did not adequately account for the nature of man; and finally he omitted any consideration of supernatural religion. Approaching his program of the transmission of experiences, ideas, etc., from the point of

view of his fundamental philosophical tenets, we consider that he does not adequately provide for the idealizing aspect of the vital process. The principles of his philosophy promote an individualization that has its check in socialization, i. e., in the active process to which individuals are subordinate. In the medley of social life, these counter-processes forbid a communication of common experiences, ideas, etc. Instead of promoting what should be common social traits, as trustworthiness, confidence, sympathy and toleration, they sometimes result in anti-social traits, as infidelity, suspicion, antagonism and bigotry. The need for idealization arises in the unification and direction of these counter-processes. The lack of such an idealization in Dewey's philosophy results in the tendency to subject society unduly to the individual; it is not the opposite, inasmuch as he emphasizes change rather than conformity.

Our exposition is aided by recounting the tenets of Scholasticism in the same general way as we have recounted the tenets of Mr. Dewey's philosophy. That system proposes permanent and abiding principles in the intellectual order, and fixed ultimate goals in the moral order. It accepts an objective criterion by means of which truth may be distinguished from error. It upholds the spiritual nature of man, and supposes for its fulfillment the truths and ideals coming from supernatural religion. The idealization which proceeds from such fundamental truths gives the bases for individual action in a social medium.

Dewey is but one of the many in the modern world who are groping about in the darkness seeking truth. Who is there who will not commend his honest efforts at establishing a sure foundation for morality and intelligence? Those who differ with him must bear testimony to the sincerity and nobility of his efforts. His ethical theory does not mean that individuals are to do as they please. He would have them ever promoting the social welfare. His attempts to unify all men in one great whole, social though it be, reminds one of that supreme unification which is the Mystical Body of Christ, and of which the Lord Christ is Head. The differences between the social body and the Mystical Body are obvious.

There are two extremely important truths that modern society cannot escape; the one is the tendency to evil in man, the other is the need of an ideal, and a perfect ideal. Our nature has been

tainted, and strive as we may, we cannot circumvent the fact. We have lost the divine, supernatural gift of original justice, by which reason was subject to God, the lower powers were subject to reason, and the body was subject to the soul.¹⁵ Education must respect this profound truth of far reaching importance. Foerster, one of the outstanding character educators of our times, says: "The dogma of original sin is one of the foundations of all sound education."¹⁶

The other important truth for modern society is the need of an ideal. St. Paul says: "As by the offense of one man, unto all men to condemnation; so also, by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just."¹⁷ We must accept our original inheritance; we may or may not accept redemption and justification. In other words, we must accept Adam; we may or may not accept the Christ. He is the perfect Ideal, whom modern society is seeking. In Him the individual and society find sound idealization, and education advances. To quote again from Foerster: "The dogma of the Man-God is the foundation of all true education,"¹⁸ and indeed of all living.

The discussion of the relations of the individual to society is paramount in the consideration of the ideal of education. "Social efficiency in a democracy," expresses Dewey's formulation of the ideal. Obviously, individualization, socialization and idealization enter into the ideal of social efficiency. We commend his program of the transmission of values, ideals, principles, and experiences, but consider that his philosophy practically defeats such an ideal. He accounts for individualization and socialization, but does not sufficiently account for idealization. Throughout, his penetrating interest in process obscures the vision of permanent truths, permanent motives, and permanent goals. His emphasis upon the process of knowing, or the genesis of beliefs, prevents him from realizing that philosophy and religion deliver to man a body of knowledge, of duties, and ideals, into the possession of which men should ordinarily grow. It is our insistence

¹⁵ Cf. St. Thomas, *De Malo*, Q. 4; a. 1.

¹⁶ Quoted by De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique*, p. 326.

¹⁷ *Epistle to Romans*, V, 18-19.

¹⁸ Quoted by De Hovre, *op. cit.*, p. 326.

upon the permanent elements in life rather than the changing elements that causes us to differ with Mr. Dewey. Like him, we would encourage people to think, simply because we do not consider that all present institutions and present practices are in a state of perfection. We maintain, however, that sound thinking needs the permanent and abiding principles of the intellectual order and fixed goals in the moral order. It is one thing to encourage people to think, and quite another thing that people recognize those broad outlines within which thinking should operate. Thus, no amount of thinking can ever weaken the position which principles and ideals of justice and charity should have in human life. Further, such institutions as the family and private property will emerge safe and secure from the most penetrating investigations of the cleverest thinker. We do not know exactly what Mr. Dewey's position would be in regard to these institutions. He perhaps would not take a definite stand, but would rather suspend his judgment until the workings of supplanting institutions were observed. Even then his views would be conditional.

Social efficiency has need for the permanent elements in life, for lasting principles, truths, and motives that are for everyone, at all times and in all places, valid. Then the reconstruction of life proceeds apace, and changes are introduced into the social fabric without disorder.

De Hovre says that the capital defect in Dewey's theories lies in the complete absence of a religious sense which alone would have helped him to avoid many of the mistakes he has made in the formulation of his theory.¹⁹ As religion has a definite place in human life, we consider that its absence weakens Dewey's ideal of social efficiency. He makes provision in his scheme for the second commandment of the Law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," but he neglects entirely the first commandment: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with thy whole mind and with thy whole strength."²⁰

Religion contributes most efficaciously to the cause of Democracy. Msgr. Ryan says: "Democracy is at bottom a religious ideal; for democracy is the political expression of the divine

¹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 98.

²⁰ *Mark*, XII, 30-31.

commandment of love, and love is in the last analysis freedom."²¹ Kerby gives us the following thoughts on democracy: "Democracy finds its thinking on essentials completed by Christ." . . . "Revealed religion complete in both intellectual and moral content solves the essential problem (i. e., the problem of the unity of life, truth, and action) in the supernatural view of life and the law of its behavior."²²

We consider, therefore, that Mr. Dewey's program of "social efficiency in a democracy" is weakened by the complete absence of the truths and ideals of supernatural religion.

Another means of approach to the consideration of the ideal of "social efficiency in a democracy" is opened to us by an investigation of the "active" and "passive" virtues. The reader of Dewey's pages cannot but recognize the importance which he attaches to "initiative," "inventiveness," "resourcefulness," "assumption of responsibility," etc. He classifies them among the active virtues, as against what he terms the colorless, negative virtues, "obedience," "submission," "self-control," "self-restraint," "self-sacrifice," etc.²³ The reasons for his preference are not hard to find. The psychology which he accepts is the kind that extols activity, and the virtues which he emphasizes are the virtues of activity. Again, he rejects the existence of any ordered, definite and permanent body of truths, principles, and ideals, which the individual should make his own, and in the service of which the "passive" virtues are necessary.

We admit that the active virtues have a very definite place in human life, but, at the same time, we maintain that they need the directing power coming from the vision of all life. Control over environment which they promote, may be the outpouring of an activity which gives men control over their fellow men. It may be conducive to the exploitation of others, to the suppression of the weak by the strong, or it may lead to the confusion, chaos, and disorder associated with Bolshevism. Finally, it may lead to the substitution of "bullets for ballots."²⁴ These possibilities

²¹ James H. Ryan, "Inaugural Address," *Catholic Educational Review*, XXVI (Dec., 1928), 590.

²² Wm. J. Kerby, *The Social Mission of Charity*, pp. 77, 85.

²³ Cf. *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 297; *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 138 ff.

²⁴ Cf. Wm. P. Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 172. New York: Macmillan Co., 1925.

posit the need for an idealization in directing the activities of men seeking control of environment.

There is an assumption underlying the approbation of the "active" virtues to the neglect of the "passive" virtues. It finds its expression in the theory of man's natural goodness. The origin of the theory in modern times is attributed to Rousseau who said: "Coming from the hands of the author of all things, everything is good; in the hands of man everything degenerates." "How can you prove that the evil tendencies of which you pretend to cure him (Emile) will not arise from your mistaken care rather than from nature itself."²⁵ Dewey's adherence to the theory may be gathered from the quotation: "The child is born with a natural desire to give out, to do, to serve."²⁶ To understand the supreme importance he attaches to the active virtues, one must realize that he accepts this theory of natural goodness. A writer commenting on this theory of Dewey's remarks: "Let any one who has growing children observe them closely and decide for himself whether they exude spontaneously this eagerness for service. Let him then supplement this observation by a survey of the working of the theory on the larger scale for several generations past."²⁷ It is commonplace to remark that there comes a time early in the child's life when individual freedom and activity have need of adult direction.²⁸

In individual, as well as in social, life the great thing is to control activities by principles which have been demonstrated many times as true and as profitable. There is a saying that "experience is the best teacher," the force of which has been brought home to everyone. It is true that the child who has for the first time put its hand upon the hot stove has learned more in one short space of time than manifold admonitions could accomplish. But it is likewise true that the keen realization of the physical, mental, and moral cost of personal experience but impresses the fact that in many forms of human activity vicarious experience is to supplant the personal. The latter kind becomes more imperative because of the demands of a complex

²⁵ *Emile*, Bk. I, pp. 1, 44.

²⁶ *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 22.

²⁷ Irving Babbitt, "President Eliot and American Education," *Forum*, LXXXI (Jan., 1929), 5-6.

²⁸ Cf. Thomas Verner Moore, *Dynamic Psychology*, pp. 160-168. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1926.

life. Our social heritage contains valuable portions which have been settled once for all as worthy of possession by all. In many things, to think correctly is to think as great leaders like Aristotle.²⁹

Centuries have proved the futility of individual experimenting on certain factors of life. There is an ideology arising from the dictates of reason and from the will of God that is most salutary in directing for human progress the energetic expressions of human initiative and inventiveness. The total view of reality, a *Weltanschauung*, combines social solidarity with the potentialities of personal action. This tones down and gives direction to activity; it makes it reasonable and overcomes wanton activity.

Social efficiency is aided, not hindered, by devotion to the "passive" virtues, which in a sense are the most active forces in the world. We refer to the self-control, self-restraint, and humility, which proceed from a recognition of the ideal life. Social reform proceeds from individual reform. In fact, the antagonism between the individual and society, between man and man, is but the social expression of the conflict of the flesh and the spirit, of the law of the members and the law of the mind. The first great combat is that waged in the inner conscience of the individual. It is the conflict of high ideals and spiritual aspirations contending with adverse tendencies and passionate promptings. To the extent that the individual conquers himself, lives according to his ideals, to such an extent is he capable of exercising a wholesome influence upon his neighbor and society. A program for social betterment requires such an idealization in individual life. Considered only from its negative aspect, it is clear at a glance that many social evils would be averted were individuals to accept the highest ideals of life and live according to them. In its positive aspects, idealization brings spirited motivation and promotes a genuine initiative, inventiveness, etc.

A complete account of man's nature and a recognition of a full philosophy of life would make secure, more abiding, and more meaningful, the ideal of "social efficiency in a democracy."

²⁹ Cf. John H. Cardinal Newman, *The Idea of a University*, p. 127. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1927.

ELEMENTS OF AIM

Foerster says that "the science of ideals is the most important auxiliary science of education."³⁰ Education as such has no aim. It is of itself indifferent as to the purpose which is to be attained. Accordingly, it is the business of philosophy to determine for education the goals toward which it should strive. Education is not primarily and immediately concerned with the whole field of philosophy. What is desired is that a true, concise, and definite ideal of life be transmitted to it that will account for its efforts and direct in proper channels the process which it initiates.

We shall consider here separately the elements of the ideal which Dewey enumerates. Is the ideal merely within experience? Must it be flexible? Must it release activity? These are the elements which Dewey considers must constitute a working aim. The Catholic ideal being frankly theocentric, as opposed to an anthropocentric ideal, postulates as basal an aim that lies outside of experience. Just as the human mind is not limited to changing aspects of reality, so there is delivered to education an ideal that lifts itself above experience and controls and directs it. The immediate aim of life arises from a consideration of man's nature; the mediate aim lies not in any created good, but in God. From this viewpoint, "education is a cooperation of human agencies with the Creator for the attainment of His purpose in regard to the individual who is to be educated, and in regard to the social order of which he is a member."³¹

Foerster remarks that "the decisive factor in all education lies in the depth and solidity of the conception the educator has formed of life."³² It belongs to the nature of an ideal that it sets up a goal of perfection; an aim within experience merely sets up a goal of partial forms of perfection, which through gradual contributions of the race shall approach full perfection. Our conception recognizes the last end of man as union with God, and the end of the individual is independent from that of other members of the race. It has the advantages of being an ideal which is spiritual, clear, definite, and immutable. An aim that

³⁰ Quoted by De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pedagogique*, p. 125.

³¹ N. C. W. C., Official Attitude of the Catholic Church on Education, *Ed. Bull.* No. 1, p. 5.

³² Quoted by De Hovre, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

wavers and fluctuates with experience is false to the high demands and eternal vocation of the individual. While the aim that is defended is theocentric, it by no means postulates a disregard for human affairs. It rather realizes that now, and in the long run, service of God ennobles, elevates, and sanctifies individual and social life. It rather stimulates than diminishes activity in the relief of human estate. It makes a frank and honest estimate of the individual as he is in his own nature, and in his quality of a social being, and lays open the path by which he may ascend to God. The history of Christianity is a record of the sublime service rendered to men under the influence of the divine ideal of life. It is not too much to say that every realm of life has felt the influence of the Christian ideal. The Catholic Church is rightfully said to be the Mother of civilization. "If you plucked out of the web of our civilization all that it owes to the Catholic Church, how much would be left to the credit of paganism, modern commercialism, materialism, pantheism, or to any form of those bad philosophies of life which are the open sources of so many ills and woes of our modern world? Democracy cannot easily exorcise the evil spirit of selfishness, nor can it easily quell the hard passions of envy and jealousy."³³ In promoting cooperation and reconstruction, the two elements of social efficiency, an ideal of perfection, arising from man's nature and finding its loftiest expression in the divine intelligence, is basic. Without a candid acknowledgment of whence we have come, of our nature, and destiny, the attempts to promote true fraternity and progress lose that essential content which alone can further these worthy ideals. It is not to be assumed that an immutable aim restrains or confines activity. Paradoxical as it may seem, a fixed ideal of perfection becomes the most flexible of ideals. In democratic society, the citizen who obeys just laws is the one who is really free in the expressions of his personality. He places no restraining force on his life by immoral or injudicious interference with the person, property, or life of another. By recognizing basal claims of others, he secures for himself the greatest leeway of freedom. Binding himself, he really releases himself for activity. So also with a stable, fixed, immutable ideal of life. It sets up a goal that is

³³ Thomas J. Shahan, Address, *The Catholic Educational Association Bulletin*, XVII (Nov., 1920), p. 25.

attainable and organizes all human energy about this goal. It sets no limit to activity but directs it into the proper channels. The opposite of a fixed ideal is a changing ideal, depending upon the elements which force themselves in attention. A fixed ideal sees the present in its full context; it gives it meaning in the proper setting, and consequently organizes effort for adequately dealing with the present. It binds itself to plan, to eternal principles, and binding itself it releases itself for activity. Consequently a fixed ideal is flexible in the genuine meaning of the term flexibility.

The third element in aim is here considered as the direction and control of activity rather than the releasing of activity. The following quotation brings out the need of control: "Monsieur Rodrigues, in his brilliant analysis of American life, 'The People of Action,' insists in his concluding chapter that Americans have no thought-out philosophy of life, idealistic or otherwise, except in so far as it is the immediate outcome of action. Americans throw themselves with abandon into all lines of strenuous endeavor, he contends, trusting somehow that the discipline of the struggle with things or the dumb compelling logic of the facts will make clear to the actors themselves the meaning of it all. But the mariner adrift in the Gulf Stream is not able to get any check either upon the speed or the direction of his movements. He may imagine that strenuous exertions with oar and sail will help him solve his problem of orientation. Men are prone to mistake the sheer glow of action, the mere pleasure of self-assertion, for progress. The urgent call of new tasks, that seem to emerge upon the heels of old tasks done, is interpreted as achievement and growth. Moreover, in the hot clash of wills and the friction of facts ideas, struck out like sparks from the anvil, are often short-lived. They lack maturity and sequence. They exhibit all the defects of their accidental origin."³⁴ In the maelstrom of activity characteristic of American life, it is not so much the release of activity as the adequate control and direction of activity that is needed. This is supplied by a philosophy of life, which reviewing all life, sets up as standard a clearly defined, fixed, and immutable goal. If there be no core of experience that is above experience, and capable of giving guidance,

³⁴ John M. Mecklin, "Some Limitations of the Social Emphasis in Education," *School and Society*, IX (May 17, 1919), 590-591.

then all that is left is complete surrender to perpetual flux. Then the exigencies of situations evoke truths and principles and ideals, and the latter are as changeable as experience. The philosophy of life, here accepted for guidance, sets up as criteria for aim: (1) That it be outside of experience; (2) that it be stable, fixed, and immutable; (3) that it release activity properly only when it controls it. These demands of a universally valid aim are set against those established in the conception of life under examination, viz., (1) the aim must exist within experience; (2) it must be flexible; and (3) it must release activity.

CHAPTER V

A REVIEW OF DEWEY'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF EDUCATION

EDUCATION AS LIFE AND EDUCATION AS PREPARATION FOR LIFE

Different philosophies of life and education necessarily give rise to different conceptions of the aims of education and of the factors involved in the educative process. It is not strange, therefore, that Dewey's ideas concerning the purpose of education, the curriculum, the rôle of the teacher, and the part of the pupil should differ considerably from the ideas of educators who uphold a different philosophy from his. A comparison of his views on these points with that of the Scholastics is the purpose of this chapter.

Dewey maintains that "education . . . is a process of living and not a preparation for future living."¹ This statement reveals the basis of his educational structure. His position here is in line with his delimitation of the field of philosophy to the problems which are now open and obvious. Everything is changing in his outlook; in effect, he says what works to-day, what is good to-day, may not operate or give satisfaction in the future; our very institutions are even now under our eyes undergoing modifications; there is no guarantee that they will attain permanency; our economic problem, capital *vs.* labor, is acute, the most outstanding social problem.² Change is for him the one permanent, abiding fact or process. To educate for the future would be to recognize the permanency of the present social order and perpetuate its evils. Accordingly, neglecting the accomplishments of adult life, its ideals, its principles, its modes of behavior, etc., he sets up the present problems of childhood as the criterion for selecting subject-matter. Educa-

¹ *My Pedagogic Creed*, p. 7.

² *Democracy and Education*, p. 366.

tion is to be oriented about the needs and interests of childhood. It is to be motivated by the intense interest which ensues upon real and personal problems to solve.³ The environment to be supplied by the teacher is to be simplified, purified, and balanced.⁴ Activity is the keynote in meeting the problems that arise, and every pupil is to bring his own unique contribution for the welfare of all. The reconstruction of experience is provided for by individual activity; cooperation, by working with others and by bringing distinctive capacities to the task.

Dewey's conception of "education as life" is not entirely new. Rousseau had the same idea. He says: "It is not for you to choose what he (Emile) shall know, what he shall do. It is chosen and foreordained, and he only holds the key to his own secret."⁵ Rousseau considers as "barbarous" that education "which sacrifices the present to an uncertain future, loads the child with every description of fetters, and begins, by making him wretched, to prepare for him some far-away indefinite happiness he may never enjoy."⁶ Dewey accepts Rousseau's central idea that "the child is best prepared for life as an adult by experiencing in childhood what has meaning for him as a child, and further, the child has a right to enjoy his childhood."⁷ The phrase, "what has meaning for him as a child," is set over against what has meaning for the adult. Rousseau rejected the social phase of education, leaving education entirely to the process of nature as operating through the individual. The social phase of education, according to Dewey, was brought to the front through the efforts of Froebel and Pestalozzi. He says of the latter: "He realized that natural development for a man means social development, since the individual's vital connections are with others even more than with nature. In his own words: 'Nature educated man for social relations, and by means of social relations. Things are important in the education of man in proportion to the intimacies of social relations into which man enters.'"⁸

³ Cf. *The Child and Curriculum*, p. 32 ff. *Democracy and Education*, pp. 63-65.

⁴ Cf. *Democracy and Education*, p. 24.

⁵ *Emile*, p. 19.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷ *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 18.

⁸ *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 62.

Dewey has contributed a service to education by the thorough way in which he has pleaded the cause of the child; education cannot proceed without making its point of departure the needs and interests of childhood. His emphasis upon childhood to the neglect of the value of adult life has, however, aroused a veritable storm of protest.

The participation theory, which expresses in another way the formula of "education as a process of living," has its outstanding representative in curriculum construction in J. L. Merriam of the University of Missouri. His book, *Child Life and the Curriculum*, contains the leading exposition of the use of child life in describing the objectives and materials of education. A slightly modified form of the participation theory is presented in a recent book, *The Child-Centered School*, by Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker of the Lincoln School of Teachers College at Columbia University. The slogan of the new school, as proposed by them, is "disciplined initiative." Adult insight is to provide for the future life of the pupil: "The new school is a child's world in a child's size environment. Here he lives in a democracy of youth. His needs, his interests, as well as adult insight concerning his future life, determine what goes on in this school."⁹

There is another school of educational thought which advances the preparation theory. One of the chief leaders of this school is Franklin Bobbitt. He says: "Education is a preparation for the affairs of the mature world,"¹⁰ and again, "Education is primarily for adult life, not for child life. Its fundamental responsibility is to prepare for the fifty years of adulthood, not for the twenty years of childhood and youth."¹¹ The difficulty presented by such a criterion is that it makes present practices the norm, and tends therefore to gravitate towards a static society. Bode, commenting on Bobbitt's criterion, says: "Our very sensitiveness to the demands that modern life makes upon the individual may easily induce us to center our attention too

⁹ Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker, *The Child-Centered School*, p. 2. Yonkers-on-Hudson: World Book Co., 1928.

¹⁰ Franklin Bobbitt, *The Curriculum*, p. 207. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918.

¹¹ Franklin Bobbitt, *How to Make a Curriculum*, p. 8. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924.

exclusively on the need of preparing pupils for the specific vocational and civic duties of adult life. That is, we may be tempted to slur over the fact that in a democratic society it is quite as important to prepare individuals to meet *changing* conditions and, moreover, to have a part in bringing about desirable changes."¹² It is true of an aristocratic society as well as a democratic society that change must be provided for, for it is of the nature of life that it advances and creates new situations with new demands. The changes are more numerous in a democratic type of social order.

Present educational practice is markedly in favor of a combination of these two theories, education as participation and education as preparation. The members of the committee on curriculum-making of the National Society for the Study of Education accept the following principle: "We would stress the principle that in the selection and validation of curriculum-materials expert analysis must be made both of the activities of adults and of the activities and interests of children. The data from adult life go far to determine what is of permanent value; the data from child life go far to determine what is appropriate for education in each stage of the child's development."¹³

Peters, who upholds the combination theory, writes: "There is one contemporary school of educational theorists that is urging the universalization of the method of teaching through spontaneous activity, at least in case of the younger pupils." In a note he indicates that the reference is to the "disciples of John Dewey."¹⁴ He makes it the "fundamental thesis" of his volume "that the offerings of a school should be determined by the needs of life," that is "of *all* life, not only of adult life."¹⁵ On the question of participation he takes direct issue with Dewey. He says: "Whatever the child gets through the guided activity must be worth getting, and must be got better by reason of the adult's participation, if such participation is to justify itself. If the teacher is to be worth anything, he must look ahead, direct

¹² Boyd H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 34. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927.

¹³ *The Twenty-Sixth Year Book*, N. S. S. E., Part II, The Foundations of Curriculum-Making, p. 13.

¹⁴ Charles C. Peters, *Foundations of Educational Sociology*, p. 306. New York: Macmillan Co., 1925.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

the activities (covertly, of course) in harmony with a purpose, see to it that they lead to something. In this respect the present writer takes direct issue with what Professor Dewey says about education as preparation in his *Democracy and Education*.”¹⁶ Chapman and Counts uphold the place of child interest but make it subordinate to the acquisition of “habits, skills, knowledge, procedures and ideals, powers which will, with a high degree of probability, be employed by the individual in the important activities of his life.”¹⁷ They hold likewise that “interest as the major criterion for the selection of subject matter is a pernicious guide,” and “any system of education which sets up child or student interest as its guiding star is doomed to failure.”¹⁸ Snedden, an educational sociologist, advocates preparation for life. He says: “Do the supporters of even the most modern types of education contend that, in the activities which they systematically promote through the school hours, there is no objective in, or reference to, the uses to be made of these by young persons in adult years? It is characteristic of all civilized, as contrasted with primitive, human beings that the former are not satisfied to live “for the present day. The very essence of organized life is planning, pre-arrangement, organization, and the gradual development of prevision.”¹⁹ Groves says that the “chief problem of educational effort is better men and women, people of wiser minds, greater vitality and sanity, more adequately prepared for the ordeals of life.”²⁰ Another writer, a social philosopher, upholds the preparation theory when he says: “The young self needs guidance, needs to have presented to him the stimuli and patterns of thought and conduct which the experience of the race shows to be the best to fit him to live as a social individual.”²¹ Finney rightly maintains that “in savage societies it is true that education is life,

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 294; cf. *Democracy and Education*, pp. 63-65, 79, 375.

¹⁷ J. C. Chapman and G. S. Counts, *Principles of Education*, p. 371. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 376-377; cf. p. 172, and note p. 394.

¹⁹ David Snedden, *What's Wrong with American Education*, p. 161. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1927. Cf. pp. 162-163.

²⁰ Ernest R. Groves, *Social Problems and Education*, p. 403. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1925.

²¹ Joseph A. Leighton, *Individuality and Education*, p. 101. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1928.

not a preparation for life; but this is true only in savage societies."²²

The contrasting points of view but emphasize the fact that in the work of education the crucial need is for a guiding philosophy of life. This must be formulated in the minds of educators, teachers, parents, etc., to give the ultimate and final reason for the work which they undertake. The theory of participation presents a portion of truth and in its emphasis upon the child's needs and interests it has vitalized learning, made the school more appealing and interesting to the pupils, and particularly has attempted to dovetail the work of the school with that of out-of-school agencies; it has motivated learning by extolling activity; and by providing children with a multiplicity of devices, it has encouraged freer and fuller intercourse with one another and with the teacher; it has glorified freedom and individuality.

The theory of preparation has also performed a service. It looks upon child life, its interests, and its needs, from the orienting point of adult life. It has proposed a series of objectives of school life by analysis of adult activities. The view which it upholds is that the child is to be equipped with a repertoire of skills, habits, and ideals that men generally need now in actual life. Interest, activity, and motivation are to proceed from and be guided by the definite objectives that are gathered from life. The tendency of this theory is to glorify present practice as ideal, but it seems to ignore the fact that life is changing in manifold respects. Again, it confuses present practice with ideal practice. Fundamentally it should seek something deeper, a philosophy of life that rises above present practice and criticizes it.

The viewpoint defended here is that of the combination theory as a reflection of the viewpoint of the relations of the individual

²² Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, pp. 364, 154 ff. Other references on the question of "education as life" vs. "education as preparation for life" are:

Henry Harap, "Free Activity and Imposed Purposes," *Educational Review*, LXXIII, 26-27.

Paul McKee, "Education for Present or Future Needs," *Teachers Journal and Abstract*, III, 323-324.

Joseph S. Taylor, "Development or Utility, Which?" *School and Society*, XXIII, 509-512.

to society. The organic union of the two viewpoints is necessary to advance adequately the cause of education, just as the organic union of the individual and society promotes the general welfare. The system which makes the child's needs and interests the basis of school life manifests the deep underlying philosophy which tends to subject in an undue manner society to the individual. The participation theory implies the subjection of the individual to society. One is radically based on change, the other is smugly contented with the acquisition of the best universal practice in the present order.

The interests of the individual and of society are consequently best served by the ideal combination of education as life and education as preparation for life. Such a combination respects the present equipment of the child, his needs, capacities, interests and experience; but it maintains that these are to be directed and guided in the light of the truths and principles made known to us through a vision of the ideal of life.

THE RÔLE OF SUBJECT-MATTER IN THE SCHOOL

All education makes its point of departure the child, but it is only the ideal of life that can adequately give direction. To say that education must concern itself with the interests and needs of children is to utter a half-truth; its complement is that all education is made meaningful by the ideal. Maritain expresses this well when he remarks: "It is clear that the educator ought to adapt himself to the infant, but education properly so-called begins then only when the infant is adapted to the educator, to the culture, the truth, and systems of value, which the educator has the mission of transmitting."²³ As Foerster says: "Education does not consist solely in the adaptation of the teacher to the pupil but at least to the same extent in the adaptation of the pupil to the teacher."²⁴

It is the business of the ideal of education formulated from the ideal of life to extract from the wisdom of the ages the best elements attainable and communicate these to the child. The latter cannot be too early provided with a philosophy of life to govern his present actions and prepare him for the future.

²³ Franz De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique*, p. viii.

²⁴ Quoted by De Hovre, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

It is dangerous to leave to his interactions with his companions the chance, and perhaps in most cases erroneous, conception of life. As Finney remarks: "Pretentious as the term may sound, there can be no greater mistake than to suppose that a philosophy of life is only for adults. Instead, it is something that we all acquire during childhood."²⁵ This is particularly the work of those in charge of the child. His greatest good arising from school life is the view of the world he receives and makes his own. In the new education the teacher assumes the task of providing the environment. But it is our basic contention that cooperation and interaction with the teacher is the most important element of this environment. The very nature of the school demands that the teacher assume and execute his indispensable rôle of interpreting for his pupils in terms of fundamentals the meaning of the experiences which they undergo. Truth in any line of endeavor is very difficult to attain; the history of its acquisition is a record of untold effort and patient research. It has been arrived at sometimes only after centuries of collective effort, and in the attempts to attain it the human mind has often fallen into error. The school was established purposely to convey a maximum of truths, principles, habits, and ideals in a minimum of time. Certain things are so well-established that it is dangerous for children, or even adults, to experiment with them.

The intellectual and moral capital of civilization is so vast that a critical appraisal in the light of general organizing principles is necessary. These flow from the ideal of education and attain thereby permanent and abiding value. The resources of civilization become the property of the child through the attainment of goals set up by the teacher. To wait upon the expression of child's interests and needs for goals of activity is to neglect the approved values of race experience. The ideal is the combination of children's purposes and adult purposes. The former bring with them genuine motivation for real learning. But it is of primary importance to take care lest child purposes dominate the curriculum; for the child's interests and needs are of short duration, and it is impossible for him to realize without adult help the larger and more meaningful goals which

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 289.

direct all learning. To try to build a scheme of education upon the natural inclinations and aptitudes of the uneducated is like erecting a heavy structure on shifting sands. It is necessary to advocate pupil activity; but it can be saved from being wasteful of valuable time and energy only in so far as it is directed by the ideals which the teacher should possess and which he should make the property of the children. It is a fundamental principle of all education that it must be based not simply on the natural inclination to activity or to study, but on a reasoned conviction of the value and necessity of study.²⁶ The communication of the latter is principally the work of the teacher. Accordingly, positing a body of invaluable treasures in the way of skills, information, and ideals which a full philosophy approves, there arises the need for the teacher of providing, or having provided, a logical organization of subject-matter. A chance organization resulting from the expressions of child's needs and interests tends to defeat the very purposes of the school, of helping the child to the attainment of the ideal life. Bode, who champions the logical organization of subject-matter, says: "There is considerable justification for the view that all this emphasis on 'pupil activity,' on the one hand, and a hazy 'practicality' on the other, has operated to make present-day education an intolerably superficial kind of thing. To advocate curriculum construction on the basis, not of subjects, but of pupil activity, easily results in neglect of logical organization."²⁷ The activity of the child has become so sacrosanct that the accusation of adult imposition arises should that activity be interfered with; as a result, activity is often engaged in for the sake of activity, and education tends towards no more definite goals than those which the constructive thinking of children can formulate. Interest, motivation and learning arise by reason of activity, but the most important element—direction—is sidestepped because it imposes adult forms of thought, belief, and conduct; and because it introduces artificial elements that may weaken or deaden the real learning that comes from problems children set up and attempt to solve.

Pupil activity needs the constant assistance and direction of

²⁶ Cf. Alexander Meiklejohn, "Who Should Go to College?" *The New Republic*, LVII (Jan. 16, 1929), 240-241.

²⁷ *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 36.

the competent teacher, simply because the pupil's judgment is not sufficiently ripened to be able to extract the invaluable elements of the social heritage. Emphasis upon environment rather than upon the teacher glorifies pupil purpose rather than teacher purpose. Montague is of the opinion that an overemphasis of pragmatism in the school is found in the tendency to carry to an extreme the elective system. "To leave a child free to study any subject or none is simply to deprive him of his social inheritance. He cannot choose intelligently until he knows what there is to choose *from*. If we wished to make a civilized man out of a savage, we should not take him direct from his forest and put him naked in a department store, bidding him choose whatever clothing caught his fancy. The child is intellectually and culturally naked, and the only life he knows independent of our teaching is the forest life of his instincts. Why should we expect him in the name of 'individuality' and 'self-realization' to repeat all that the race has learned by generations of trial and error? To abstain from all compulsion and all prescription in the teaching of children is, we repeat, merely to rob them of their rightful social heritage."²⁸ It is true to say that every generation witnesses the transformation of a "potential savage into a responsible citizen," and that this transformation is both the work of the pupil himself and of the teacher. The teacher's task is to aid the pupil in engrafting rational control upon native instincts, and in suggesting actions which are most profitable and which may lead to the higher levels of life.

THE RÔLE OF THE TEACHER IN THE SCHOOL

Professor Dewey compares the school to the ideal home, in which the prudent and foresighted parents make ample provision for the education of their children. Surely it is not a practice dangerous to the child's personality should parents indicate and suggest ideals which are to guide the child's life, or truths and principles which are to enrich and direct his growth. The hopes of parents rest in this very thing that the children they guide will grow up in accord with the high ideals which they set up.

²⁸ Wm. Pepperell Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, p. 142. New York: Macmillan Co., 1925. Cf. p. 147.

The helplessness of the child in properly evaluating the criteria of parents but stresses the grave responsibility which the latter must assume.] It is characteristic of St. Paul that he should emphasize the responsibility of parents in educating their children. After exhorting children to obey their parents in the Lord, for it is just, he commands the latter: "Provoke not your children to anger: but bring them up in the discipline and correction of the Lord."²⁹ In the home, discipline and correction come from the parents. They present by example and direction the highest excellence in life and sponsor such activities as will in accord with their rich experience enable the child to secure full development of personality. This ideal is insured by the helpful and prudent guidance of parents.

The school is the ideal home magnified. It is made up of children from many homes, bringing a wealth of experiences of various kinds. It is a place where their horizon of learning, of doing, of cooperating, is enlarged and extended. The teacher's task is accordingly magnified. As parents do not merely provide an environment for action, neither is the teacher's task merely the provision of the best environment. The teacher is the most important factor in the school environment. In Dewey's conception of education, the teacher's business is to keep himself out of personal relations with the pupil as much as possible and to substitute indirect for direct control. His emphasis is upon response to situation rather than to teacher. These points are to be understood in the light of his theory of education as a process of living, built upon children's needs and interests in a selected social medium. In a conception of education which recognizes the importance of invaluable elements in the social and spiritual heritages, i. e., of elements that are everywhere and at all times true, the work of the teacher is modified in that he establishes personal relations with every pupil as far as possible, suggesting, advising goals about which the pupil's activity converges. This conception recognizes in the teacher the necessity of possessing an adequate knowledge of child psychology, subject-matter, and method. Adherence to the laws of learning is obviously necessary, as well as such thoroughgoing grasp of subject-matter as will allow for flexibility in method.

²⁹ Ep. to *Ephes.*, VI, 4.

The psychological presentation of subject-matter is necessary for securing real learning on the part of the pupil. It consists in following the method by which man naturally learns. The logical represents what is to be taught; the psychological represents how it is to be taught. However, as the child is not to pass through all the stages of trial and error that the race has passed through in the attainment of knowledge, the teacher is called upon at times to exercise direct control over the activities of the pupils. Hence, the teacher must intervene at times and complete in a natural way the attempts of the pupils to attain meaning from experiences. Learning, in this sense, is the personal relation of the pupil to the teacher, as well as the impersonal relation of pupil to problem or project. The project method does not mean the withdrawal of the teacher from the scene of action. The pupils contribute, each one in his own unique way furnishing something for its proper execution. Its purpose may result from the needs of the pupils, or may be inspired by the teacher. From whatever source it comes, the teacher is called upon in the major projects, i. e., in sufficiently complex and long-span undertakings,³⁰ to assist in supplying information, in suggesting habits and skills worth acquiring, in advising upon goals in successive steps, and in providing ideals as the project develops.

Dewey's interpretation of the rôle of teacher in the school may be considered a modification, as directed by providing a distinct social medium, of Rousseau's interpretation: "Do not give your pupil any sort of lesson verbally: he ought to receive none except from experience."³¹ And again: "The only habit a child should be allowed to form is to contract no habits whatever."³² The evils which have ensued upon adult imposition are not to be construed in such a way, however, as to make the office of the teacher merely a passive one. There is a difference between an interference which repels by arbitrarily imposing ideas and habits, and cooperation which is reasonable and is on guard to observe closely that the ideas which are suggested become the pupil's own and enter into his thought, feeling and

³⁰ Cf. John Dewey, *Progressive Education and the Science of Education*, p. 12.

³¹ J. J. Rousseau, *Emile*, p. 56.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

conduct. In other words, authority which is reasonable is to be distinguished from authoritarianism which is unreasonable.³³ It is a record of ordinary observation that pupils are devoted to teachers who have their interests at heart, who strive tactfully to induce them to the conquest of learning and who intervene as models in the forming of certain habits. Just as parents suggest ideas and accelerate the process of acquiring useful habits, so also do teachers.

Further, just as parents exercise a reasonable and wholesome authority in the homes, so also should teachers in the schools. Authority thus conceived is characteristic of Christian education. In fact, it may be considered a differentiating trait of Christian education. Shields expresses this thought when he says: "Perhaps the most important difference to be observed between the aim of Christian education, as set forth in these pages, and the aims of education too frequently defended in current educational philosophy is to be found in the function of the principle of authority which it implies."³⁴ As Foerster says: "There can be no real educative authority without freedom, and no genuine freedom without the educative force of authority."³⁵

In a sense, the curtailing of the rôle of the teacher in suggesting ideas and in forming habits goes back to the rejection of authority and the elevation of personal freedom. It has its more remote origin in the rejection of an accepted philosophy of life, in the assimilation of which individuals may grow. In our conception, freedom is not incompatible with authority; it rather supposes it, and without it freedom tends to degenerate into license. By acquiring truth, and being convinced of it, freedom is secured, rather than destroyed. Bagley rightly looks upon freedom as a conquest, not a gift. He says: "Whether we like it or not, we cannot deny that, in the history of the race, anything that even remotely resembles freedom (freedom not only from personal thralldom, but freedom as well from want, dread, fraud, and superstition) has been a conquest, not a gift.

³³ Cf. William H. Kilpatrick, *Education for a Changing Civilization*, pp. 29 ff. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927.

³⁴ Thomas E. Shields, *Philosophy of Education*, p. 174. Washington, D. C.: Catholic Education Press, 1921.

³⁵ Quoted by Franz De Hovre, *Essai de Philosophie Pédagogique*, p. 342.

In a very real sense, education must reflect in each generation this element of struggle and conquest."³⁶ Freedom is a conquest because it is the acceptance and pursuit of what is the best, of what is ennobling in life, rather than of what is evil, of what is degrading in life. It is the direction of the physical by the spiritual, the sensitive by the rational. Such an understanding of freedom indicates a genuine plan of life. It may be remarked, with Moore that "the end of human life should be the development of the will and intellect so that truth and goodness are so interwoven that the good is voluntarily chosen by necessity."³⁷ In the acquisition of such an ideal, the pupil is aided by the teacher. Accordingly, the teacher must possess the ideal of the highest life as this is expressed in the manifold divisions of life, such as the religious, social, civic, industrial, aesthetic, etc. In seeking to inculcate the supernatural virtues of the religious life and indicating what are habits of efficiency in all departments of life, the teacher lays the foundations for making education the guardian of the treasures of the race and the bulwark of civilization.

Dewey's plan of minimizing the active rôle of the teacher in the process of education reflects his philosophy of change. Everything is changing; experience is the only reality; and hence there is no security that the ideas, habits, principles, and ideals which emerge from a fixed body of truth are the best possible. Ideas which are now in active circulation, if accepted uncritically, cloud the mind of man against progress which is his goal of existence. The habits of adults, if made the acquisition of children, represent the perpetuation of the present order and subject the individual to the present level of social improvement. Reconstruction comes from the specific reaction which individuals make in an active examination of present practices. There is without doubt some truth in the contention advanced. But it is an unwarranted departure to maintain that all the approved values of the past are to be set up for critical appraisal by children, or even by adults. The child is not left

³⁶ W. C. Bagley, *Determinism in Education*, p. 160. Baltimore: Warwick & York, 1925. Cf. Boyd H. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 19.

³⁷ Thomas V. Moore, *Dynamic Psychology*, p. 393. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1926.

to himself, but is aided at home, in the formation of physical, intellectual, and spiritual habits. So also in the school. In the Catholic school of prime import are the supernatural virtues of faith, hope, and charity and the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. The intellectual habits, such as the habits of inquiry, of concentration, persistence, reference, openmindedness, integrity, disavowal, demonstration, analysis, generalization, application, self-reliance, which Chapman and Counts³⁸ enumerate, are the kind, among other habits, which make possible individual and social development and progress.

On the whole, the "new" education minimizes the active rôle of the teacher in the school. Such a condition represents an undue reaction against the activity of the teacher under traditional education. The teacher's part in school life will also be considered under the following heading.

THE RÔLE OF THE CHILD IN THE SCHOOL

Everyone will agree with Professor Dewey that self-activity is the basis of all learning. The traditional school erred particularly in overlooking this first principle of all education, and consequently it had recourse to artificial means to induce learning. Its inordinate emphasis upon goals led to a neglect of method. Dewey, mindful of the artificial nature of the traditional school, attempts to recall all educational practice to the natural way in which children learn; and, as has been said earlier in a discussion of the "participation theory" in curriculum construction, he has by his insistence upon this fact, contributed a service to the cause of education.

The emphasis upon method brings to the fore the factor of the psychological presentation of subject-matter. It is particularly in regard to this aspect of the educative process that Dewey has contributed to the work of the school. We do not say that his contribution is original, but rather that his insistence upon the psychological is timely. The psychological represents the process of learning; the logical represents the goals. As stated above, the one has to do with how we learn; the other with what we learn.

³⁸ J. C. Chapman and G. S. Counts, *Principles of Education*, p. 389.

Text-books, equipment, appliances of all kinds, aids in psychological presentation, are generically but means to an end, i. e., to the development of personality in accord with the ideal of education. They are means at the disposal of the pupil, under the guidance of the teacher, for attaining principles, facts, ideals, and attitudes. Emphasis upon learning by doing, upon the use of every one of the senses and of every human faculty has redeemed the teacher from slavish adherence to text-books, and, positively, has brought a multitude of appliances, contact with which arouses the student's interest and helps to promote learning. However, it is well to remember that all the appliances of education are but tributary to learning, to the acquisition of wisdom. Our devotion to ways of knowing should not blind us to the end—results of knowing. Activities in wood and metal, etc., are merely means for the attainment of the best things in life. Judd subordinates them to the acquisition of the highest achievements of civilization: "The present primary curriculum is in no sense of the word likely to go on the scrap heap. Some of the radical proposals which have been heard in recent times about sandpiles as substitutes for books, and manual-training shops as substitutes for libraries, and gardens as better than multiplication tables, will probably be repeated from time to time, but there is no real probability that they will overthrow the school in the future any more than they have in the past. Books and libraries and multiplication represent the high achievements of civilization. They will not disappear because a few educational radicals think they can be dispensed with."³⁹

There is the danger in the "new" education that the introduction of manifold appliances may result merely in the continuous excitation of the senses, instead of being instruments for the promotion of the ends of education, particularly for the fostering of an intelligence and morality compatible with the demands of democracy. It is true of the new education, as well as of the old, that education is primarily an affair of the interesting teacher and the interested pupil, and that libraries, laboratories, school methods, and appliances of all kinds are but so many opportunities for the two to get together.

³⁹ *Twenty-Sixth Year Book*, National Society for the Study of Education. Part II, The Foundations of Curriculum-Making, p. 115.

In Scholastic educational philosophy self-activity is the foundation of all real learning. St. Thomas presents the scholastic explanation in a treatise entitled *De Magistro* among the *Quaestiones Disputatae*. In this treatise he does not furnish us with a treatise on educational practice, but rather he seeks to present the *raison d'être* of the teacher's work, the philosophy that underlies the whole process of education. There is an application to education of the very principles which serve as the bases for the Thomistic System of philosophy.

St. Thomas' theory on the acquisition of knowledge, the origin of ideas, is applied to the deepest aspects of the educative process. The divine influence in the acquisition of knowledge—for all knowledge comes from God and its first elements are deposited in man as *rationes seminales*—and in the whole process of learning, is indicated in regard to the teacher and the pupil. The teacher's office in cooperating with God in the process is consequently of the highest dignity. Accordingly, the teacher must possess not only the highest moral qualifications, but also he must know the subject-matter he is dealing with, explicitly and perfectly. Further, he must have an intimate knowledge of mental processes, the functions of the senses, emotions, etc., in order to minister adequately in the work of education.

Education in order to produce the best results must derive its methods from the method which the mind instinctively follows in acquiring knowledge by its own unaided effort. The teacher is not to follow any arbitrarily chosen path, but must follow along that which is natural. The perfection of his art lies in the avoidance of the artificial.

St. Thomas insists upon the fact that the mind is self-active. One has a capacity for knowledge, not in the sense of passive reception, but rather in the sense of ability to act in order to come to knowledge. Mental ability is by its native energy the principal cause of its own development. It comes forth instead of being drawn out; and if it accepts the aid of others, it does so to facilitate its action, and not to surrender or transfer its intrinsic power.

"The teacher . . . accomplishes his task *adjuvando et ministrando*. He acts with regard to the mind, says St. Thomas, as the physician with regard to the body. The physician ministers to nature, applying the remedies which the organism uses

as instruments in the work of self-restoration. The teacher, likewise, though he does not deal with abnormal conditions nor aim at re-establishing a mental vigor that has been lost, supplies the mind the assistance it needs and the means it requires for its orderly and healthy action. Mere instruction avails about as much as the dose, however powerful, which is given a depleted system. In neither case is there any vital response."⁴⁰

St. Thomas explains the active part of the pupil and of the teacher in his exposition on the art of teaching. He begins by showing that there are some arts in which the matter is not an active principle productive of the art's effect. As an example of such he cites the art of building, since in timber and stone there is not an active force tending to the production of a house, but merely a passive aptitude. However, he points out that teaching is an art of a different type by comparing in the following words the function of the teacher in aiding the pupil to that of the doctor in ministering to the sick: "On the other hand, there is an art the matter of which is an active principle tending to produce the effect of the art; such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active principle conducive to health. Consequently the effect of an art of the first kind is never produced by nature but is always the result of art. But the effect of an art of the second kind is the result both of art, and of nature without art; for many are healed by the action of nature without the art of medicine. In those things that can be done both by art and by nature, art copies nature. Now the art of teaching is like this art. For in him that is taught there is an active principle conducive to knowledge, namely the intellect, and those things which are naturally understood, namely first principles. Wherefore knowledge is acquired in two ways, both by discovery without teaching, and by teaching. Consequently the teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, namely by offering to the disciple's consideration principles known by him, since all learning results from pre-existing knowledge; and by drawing conclusions from those principles; and again by proposing sensible examples, from which there result, in the disciple's mind, the phantasms which are necessary that he may understand."⁴¹

⁴⁰ E. A. Pace, "St. Thomas' Theory of Education," *Catholic University Bulletin*, VIII (July, 1902), 297.

The teacher does not merely stimulate the mind by indicating the objects of cognition. For in the acquisition of knowledge, in passing from the known to the unknown, the intellect is not in precisely the same situation with regard to every one of its objects. Some it grasps intuitively—the *per se nota*; others it reaches by bringing out to explicit knowledge what is contained implicitly in self-evident principles. Just here it needs the teacher, not simply as a guide, but as one who by his words sets the intellectual faculty in motion and to this extent causes its advance in knowledge.

Pace gives the following as the salient features of the Thomistic theory:

"In the first place, knowledge is essentially a product of the mind and learning is a growth in self-activity. Education, consequently, is no mere imparting or infusion; it is rather a solicitation, suggestion and direction, by which the mind is prompted to exert its natural power in normal ways. The process includes three moments: innate ability in which the germs of knowledge are contained, the teacher's ministrations, and the reaction of the mind whereby it gains a knowledge of its own, albeit conformed, more or less perfectly, to the copy which the master sets.

"Secondly, while the chief stress is laid upon the development of intellectual function, due notice is taken of the subordinate faculties. Sense, imagination and memory cooperate both in the first acquisition of knowledge and in its retention." The physical side of men deserves close attention because, generally speaking, "Vigor of mind corresponds to soundness of body, so that the healthier organism ensures superior intellectual attainment."

"But the third and most significant teaching in the 'De Magistro' is that which attributes the principal part to God. For this implies that the human teacher, not figuratively but in a very real sense, cooperates in a divine work. Hence his dignity as well as his responsibility. It is surely no mean service that he is called to perform in fostering and developing the

⁴¹ *The Summa Contra Gentiles of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, Dominican Translation, vol. 2, chap. LXXV, pp. 204-205. New York: Benziger Bros., 1923.

scientiarum semina which God Himself implants and vivifies. Nor is it a trivial task that he undertakes when he leads the mind to conclusions the ultimate value of which must be determined by their relation to Original Truth. Quite aptly St. Thomas cites from St. Augustine: *Solus Deus cathedram habet in caelis qui veritatem docet interius; alius autem homo sic se habet ad cathedram sicut agricola ad arborem.*"⁴²

Underlying Dewey's exposition of learning by doing, there is an assumption that needs examination. It is this: Given an adequate medium, the individual child by cooperating with others will react in such a way that a body of information, habits, attitudes, and ideals will eventuate. Without the intervention of a capable teacher, who possesses explicitly and perfectly what he wishes the pupils to possess in turn, it is easy to see that such a result will not ensue. The interaction with physical or social environment may or may not be a desirable interaction. The teacher must know and offer guidance, suggestion, and invitation to secure the desired result. The interaction with environment expresses at best the individualizing and socializing aspects of the vital process. This is brought out in the following quotation from Dewey: "Give a child freedom to find out what he can and cannot do, both in the way of what is physically possible and what his neighbors will stand for, and he will not waste much time on impossibilities but will bend his energies to the possibilities."⁴³ "What his neighbors will stand for" expresses the socializing aspect of the vital process. In many cases it is sufficient to divert human energies, but in many other cases it produces a cautious and crafty individualism. To cite an extreme example, some criminals who are "socialized" by periods of confinement come forth not better, but more cautious men. Hence, interaction with environment does not necessarily mean the changing of desires. Our difficulty with such a scheme of educating resides in its neglect of the idealizing aspect of the vital process.

Learning by doing expresses the experimental approach to subject-matter. It is the method of discovery, the method of the laboratory. Every one recognizes the tremendous influence it has on the school. It is essential to real learning, simply

⁴² *Op. cit.*, pp. 302-303.

⁴³ *Schools of To-morrow*, p. 139.

because it expresses in a word the necessity of sense perceptions. However, to consider it the only method to be made use of would be to restrict the office of the teacher and accordingly to narrow down the possibilities of learning with the child. There is also the telling method. The teacher makes use of it in supplying ideas to the pupils and in guiding the activity of the pupils. It follows the psychological order—the way by which man naturally comes to knowledge. It ends in the overcoming of difficulties, and particularly in guiding the pupil's mind to see the relations between things, and to come to sound conclusions. With Dewey, subject-matter is ever in the process of making, and this accounts for his emphasis on learning by doing. As far as the child is concerned, subject-matter is continually being made, in the sense that the child is ever coming into the possession of the elements of the ideal life. However, by reason of its origin, some subject-matter has been made; by reason of its nature, some subject-matter is permanent. Universally accepted elements in the social heritage and firmly established truths indicate the pre-existence of some subject-matter. The acquisition of such values marks the major scope of the work of the pupil and teacher. The guiding rôle of the teacher in leading the child mind to the recognition of such permanent elements shows the importance of the teacher's work. The pupil would be able to acquire some of this material by personal experience, especially as experience is enriched, but, for the sure attainment of much of it, the interpretation and direction of the teacher are necessary. The teaching method supplies meanings and values to the experimental method. It does not supplant the latter method, nor does it mean the presentation of subject-matter from the point of view of the expert, but rather of the child. The two methods are necessary in the school. The "old" education put its emphasis on the telling method; the "new" puts its emphasis on the experimental method. Dewey does not rule out entirely the former, but he tends to minimize its importance.

"Learning by doing" does not account for all the knowledge which we possess. Our devotion to critical appraisal of influences to which we are subject should not blind us to the fact that much of the knowledge possessed is really uncritical. In the project method, much of the information children receive

is the kind that comes on testimony of others, i. e., it is not subjected to a critical test. In our present-day complex life, it is necessary that much of our information should be of the kind that comes into our possession uncritically; only a small portion arises from accurate personal thinking. Finney develops the thesis that most of our knowledge is due to a process of semi-passive mentation. He says: "We seem to have use in our pedagogical vocabulary for a new term, namely, *passive mentation*. The term social suggestion has been familiar for some time. It indicates the source of ideas. But when the mind accepts ideas uncritically from social sources the learning process is relatively passive, as compared with original perception and conceptual thinking. And the fact has been too little observed and reckoned with in theory, especially in pedagogical theory, that the contents of our minds is derived very largely from social sources through a process of relatively passive mentation. . . . On account of the iceberg fallacy, Dewey and his followers fall short of recognizing the degree to which mentation is passive and thought a mere mass action."⁴⁴ The process of semi-passive mentation makes of prime importance the necessity of purifying the popular expression of the values of the social heritage and of bringing these values up to the demands of the ideal of life. The school is the place particularly where popular misconceptions, errors, superstitions, etc., are to be corrected. Accordingly, the ideal of education must operate to evaluate the materials of the classroom. The worth of an immutable ideal lies in its full recognition of the truths, principles, and values which it sets up as criteria of examination. As account must be taken of the influence of knowing by associating, as well as by personal doing, the criteria must visualize the highest life and supply the process of semi-passive mentation with the best materials available.

This process, crowded with a great variety of false notions, inadequate explanations, superstitions, etc., emphasizes, too, the necessity of accurate thinking by adults as well as by children. The interlocking of school life with other institutions of society demands that no interference be brought to bear on the idealistic influence of the school. Information, habits, beliefs,

⁴⁴ Ross L. Finney, *A Sociological Philosophy of Education*, p. 60.

etc., present in adult life and influencing children, should be of a high order in order to secure and further the work of the school. The school exalts the principles, truths, and habits of the ideal, and hence a conflict of greater or less degree must be acknowledged between the school and life beyond the school. The more critically the adult world accepts current ideas, etc., in the light of guiding principles, the less is the scope of this conflict.

There is, therefore, a process in human association that accounts for the uncritical knowledge which man possesses. The school must take account of this process as well as of the process of independent critical thinking, of learning by doing. The ideal of education should control and direct both processes.

Simultaneously with the movement which exalts the part of independent thinking, there exists another movement which holds that many are not capable of creative thinking to any marked extent. As Finney puts it: "We hear a great deal of talk about teaching children to think independently; and just as much talk at the same time about the considerable percentage of children who are hopelessly incapable of thinking."⁴⁵ The mental testing movement has disclosed the wide variations that exist among individuals in intellectual capacity. Yet a casual acquaintance with human life reveals that many of the situations in life are met in exactly the same way by people varying in intelligence. There are numerous situations in life which are met adequately by all, simply because there has entered into mental life the accepted way of meeting them. It means that scholarship has been distributed. The adherents of productive scholarship have enlivened the work of the school; but, at the same time, much of the information, skills, and ideals of life must be brought to the attention of those in school and be made a part of their mental and physical life. Dewey restricts his philosophical ideal to the demands of life that are obtrusive in attention and, accordingly, restricts his ideal of education to the needs of life that are here and now clamoring for attention. Attention to these needs is essential, but it postulates as its complement for the sake of security, lest in caring for the part the whole may be lost sight of, that the re-

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

quirements of all life be heeded and provided for. A short view may lend itself to satisfying the present, but in the long run individual and social security and progress are better furthered by a consideration of the whole of life. Individual thinking is supremely important and is to be not only encouraged but fostered and maintained in the school. However, to equip the pupil adequately for the demands of a complex life, the school must make provision for furnishing knowledge that is of the uncritical kind. It is impossible for the child alone to discover the most valuable knowledge, the most efficient habits. A philosopher says: "The average man's opinions are much less foolish than they would be if he thought for himself; in science, at least, his respect for authority is on the whole beneficial."⁴⁶ The school, of course, is to better the condition of independent thinking with the adults of tomorrow, yet it must take into account the fact that much of our knowledge is the kind that comes on authority.

A conception of education which maintains that the school is preparation for life as well as participation in life recognizes the so-called "passive" virtues, obedience, humility, and submission, as well as the active virtues, initiative, originality, and resourcefulness. The necessity of the former set of virtues arises from the candid acknowledgment of the dual nature of man, and from the unimpeachable integrity of the body of principles a full view of life affords. Accordingly, in the management of the school, as well as in the management of the ideal home, there is need for obedience, humility, and submission. Ultimately the foundation of this view goes back to reason and the will of God,⁴⁷ from which sources arise the guiding rules of life. Neumann says: "In these days of intellectual unrest, grave mischief is being done by those catch-words which exalt 'self-expression' over self-discipline as if the two were antagonistic and the former alone worth cultivating."⁴⁸ Self-discipline, self-restraint, self-denial, obedience, etc., are stressed not as ends in themselves but as means for the attainment of a genuine development of

⁴⁶ B. A. W. Russell, *Education and the Good Life*, p. 80. New York: Macmillan Co., 1926.

⁴⁷ Cf. Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy*, pp. 5-39. New York: Macmillan Co., 1883.

⁴⁸ Henry Neumann, *Education for Moral Growth*, p. 22. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923.

personality. It is not enough that discipline should be a resultant of conflict with the environment, physical and social; it comes from within in the service of principles. The school exists to guide pupils in the light of the previously delivered race experience, and to avoid precisely the dangerous conflicts with reality by a process of substitution. An important problem of natural as well as moral education is to make effective in the lives of pupils the high ideals of life developed from our noble heritage. Vicarious experience plays an important rôle in the school of a complex civilization; it but emphasizes the need of organizing subject matter, enlivening method, making place for authority and freedom.

We may apply to "social" education, in a general review of what has been treated, the following words of Bode: "The term 'social' has become one of the catchwords of the day. But it has not solved the educational problem; it has rather set going a variety of movements which have bred uncertainty and confusion and which make imperative the need of critical appraisal. While it is granted on all hands that education to-day must look more closely to social needs and interests, and also, as a corollary to this, that education must be based more directly on the interests and capacities of childhood, there is room for the misgiving that present-day education is not always sufficiently concerned to protect the approved values of the past."⁴⁹

The findings of this chapter may be summed up thus:

Education is life, and also preparation for life. Education that is to secure and guarantee the approved values of the past finds its method in the way in which man naturally knows. It finds its content in the demands of child life, and in the body of truths, principles, procedures, ideals, and motives which the ideal of life brings to education.

Education must respect the capacities and experiences of the child.

The teacher has direct and indirect relations with the child. He not only establishes the best environment, but likewise, by suggestion, advice, and by contagious inspiration, guides the pupil in the conquest of learning.

⁴⁹ *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 33.

All education is based on self-activity. The child must actively advance in the acquisition of ideal principles and practices.

Besides the experimental method, there is also the telling method. This latter method supposes self-activity, and not passivity, on the part of the pupil. Such a method complements the method of "learning by doing."

The school, like the ideal home, has need of a wholesome and reasonable authority.

A thoroughgoing treatment of education must take full account of the contributions of the external senses, the internal sensory faculties, and the higher faculties in the acquisition of the products of the school.

The "new" education glorifies the sensitive and minimizes the rational faculties. Accordingly, it manifests an overemphasis on child purposes rather than ideal adult purposes.

The "passive" virtues have a place in the school as well as the "active" virtues. The conquest of self, in accord with the ideal of life, has an important place, as well as the conquest of environment.

The process of semi-passive mentation accounts for a large amount of human knowledge. Its existence demands recognition in the school. While the school must promote independent thinking, the demands of a complex life necessitate the fact that much knowledge must be of the dependent kind.

While Dewey accounts for individualization and socialization, he fails to give a full account of idealization. The lack of idealization explains what may be summed up as his partial account of the rôles of subject matter, of the teacher, and of the pupil in the school.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion considered the democratic conception of life and of education as presented by John Dewey, and the democratic conception of life and of education as gathered from Scholasticism. The underlying philosophy of the one is a philosophy of effect; of the other a philosophy of cause. The first is unreservedly a philosophy of change; the second is primarily dedicated to the permanent elements in life, which are the counterpoise of change and the directors of activity. The different conceptions of philosophy arose from the different solutions of the problem of knowledge; this problem was elevated to the position of the central problem of the whole discussion. We rejected the new ideal of life presented, because we regarded the solution of the problem as unnecessarily restricting what we may know and again as setting up a criterion of truth dangerous and misleading because of its subjective nature. The apotheosis of change and activity was the effect of an analysis of mind that rejected the truly spiritual nature of mind.

The distinctive solution of the problem of knowledge was the root source of the following tendencies, which, among others, were considered to characterize Pragmatic philosophy.

It regards philosophy as primarily practical and not contemplative; it narrowed down the subject-matter of philosophy to the problems of men, tending to exclude the problems of philosophers.

It was found to present an account of man's origin, nature, and destiny that was vastly different from that of Scholasticism.

It appeared to glorify process, passing by the idealization that proceeds from a knowledge of ultimate goals, because the fundamental philosophy precluded the possibility of attaining to universal truths, unchanging ideals, and fixed goals. It manifested a marked concern for individualization and socialization, but neglected the idealization which a full view of the world and of life brings to men.

While we recognized the place of originality, of inventiveness, and of initiative in life, our exposition of man's nature, of his relations to his fellowman, and to God, requires a place for self-control, self-sacrifice, self-restraint, humility and obedience.

The system under consideration gave no guarantee of preserving the approved values of our social heritage, and further no place was found for the spiritual treasures coming from Revelation and Tradition.

For the ultimate guidance of intellectual and moral life, we would complement consequences, outcomes, activities, by truths, principles, ideals, and motives.

We rejected the ideal of life under consideration because, in a word, we considered it but a partial account of life. For us life must be viewed fully.

As the ideal of life is the ideal of education, the ideal of education was *ipso facto* rejected in rejecting the ideal of life. "Social Efficiency in a Democracy," "Reconstruction of Experience," "Growth," all betray the weakness of the ideal of life. While we approved activity, we regarded the problems of the philosophy of education to begin when the direction, the evaluation, and the sponsoring of activity is undertaken. The main emphasis in the new ideal is method; but philosophy should regulate method, rather than vice-versa, because philosophy furnishes the permanent and indispensable subject-matter of method by reason of its ultimate principles, its enlightening ideals, and fixed goals. The while we commend Mr. Dewey for his unflagging activity in redeeming education from the traditional fetters which have bound it, we would envelop the new education by a well-thought-out philosophy of life. In the vision of all life, "freedom, individuality, activity, and a cooperative social medium" find their meaning and value. Freedom has its counterpart in a wholesome and judicious authority. Individuality and cooperative social action suppose an idealization proceeding from a full view of life, and activity is directed, controlled, and sponsored by dedication to the principles and duties which a recognition of the universal order requires. Differences in the fundamentals of education accounted for differences of expression of the rôles of the teacher, of the pupil, and of subject-matter in the school.

While we disagreed with Mr. Dewey, in his ultimate explanation of the ideal of life and of education, we recognized his great contributions to educational practice by his devotion to method. On this account he is one of the most outstanding educators of modern times.

In the vision of all life, wherein method finds its place, Democracy's cause is forwarded. In such a vision, intelligence and morality, the foundation stones of Democracy, are firmly secured. Under its illuminating influence Education is truly the Guardian of Civilization, and the Instrument of Progress. Individualization and Socialization are harmonized in its Idealization; and the vital process moves on, guided by the realization of the perfect outcome: temporal salvation with men and eternal salvation with God.

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VITA


The writer of this dissertation, the Rev. James Henry O'Hara, was born in Archbald, Penna., September 1, 1901. He was educated in the public schools of his native town, and graduated therefrom in June, 1917. In September, 1917, he entered St. Thomas' College, Scranton, Penna. At that institution he completed his high school education, and likewise two years of college work. In September, 1920, he entered St. Bonaventure's Seminary at Allegany, N. Y., where he received the degrees of Bachelor of Arts in 1922, and of Master of Arts in 1924. He was ordained to the priesthood on May 29, 1926. From 1926 to 1929 he pursued studies at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., receiving from that institution, in 1927, the degree of Master of Arts. He followed courses in Education, under Drs. Edward B. Jordan, George Johnson, Thomas G. Foran, John R. Rooney and Patrick J. McCormick; in Sociology, under Drs. William J. Kerby and Paul Hanly Furfey; in Psychology, under Dr. Thomas V. Moore; and in Distributive Justice, under Dr. John A. Ryan.

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